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THE DUTY TO READ THE UNREADABLE 
URI BENOLIEL* 
SHMUEL I. BECHER** 
Abstract: The duty to read doctrine is a well-recognized building block of U.S. 
contract law. This doctrine holds contracting parties responsible for the written 
terms of their contracts, whether or not they actually read them. The application 
of this duty is especially tricky in the context of consumer contracts, which con-
sumers generally do not read. Although courts routinely impose this doctrine on 
consumers, its application to consumer contracts is one-sided. Whereas consum-
ers are expected and presumed to read their contracts, suppliers do not generally 
have a duty to draft readable contracts. This asymmetry creates a serious public 
policy challenge: consumers might be expected to read contracts that are, in fact, 
rather unreadable. This, in turn, undermines market efficiency and raises fairness 
concerns. Numerous scholars have suggested that consumer contracts are indeed 
written in a way that dissuades consumers from reading them. This Article aims 
to test empirically whether this concern is justified. The Article focuses on the 
readability of an important and prevalent type of consumer agreement: the sign-
in-wrap contract. Consumers routinely accept such contracts, which have already 
been the focal point of many legal battles, when signing up for popular websites 
such as Facebook, Amazon, Uber, and Airbnb. The Article applies well-
established linguistic readability tests to the five hundred most popular websites 
in the United States that use sign-in-wrap agreements. The results of this Article 
indicate, among other things, that the average readability level of these agree-
ments is comparable to the usual score of articles in academic journals, which 
typically do not target the general public. These disturbing empirical findings 
hence have significant implications on the design of consumer contract law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Are sign-in-wrap contracts—which are commonly used by firms such as 
Google, Facebook, Uber, and Amazon—readable? Can American consumers 
be expected to read these contracts? Should courts rely on the duty to read doc-
trine and enforce such contracts against consumers? This Article tackles these 
important questions by systematically and empirically testing the level of read-
ability of highly prevalent online consumer contracts. 
The duty to read doctrine—under which a contracting party has a burden 
to read an agreement before assenting to its terms1—is an important building 
block of U.S. contract law.2 Although the duty to read is a general contract law 
doctrine, it has interesting and important implications in the context of con-
sumer standard form contracts. On the one hand, consumers—including prom-
inent law professors, consumer law academics, and the Chief Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court3—do not read such contracts.4 On the other 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See infra Part I.A. 
 2 See Roy Ryden Anderson, Disclaiming the Implied Warranties of Habitability and Good 
Workmanship in the Sale of New Houses: The Supreme Court of Texas and the Duty to Read the Con-
tracts You Sign, 15 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 517, 544 (1984) (“The duty to read has its place in the law of 
contract.”); Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 
STAN. L. REV. 545, 548 n.9 (2014) (“Courts have routinely relied upon the duty to read doctrine in 
enforcing contracts.”); Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Chal-
lenge That Is Yet to Be Met, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 723, 729 (2008) (“The duty to read contracts is a well-
recognized common law doctrine . . . .”); Michael Giusto, Mortgage Foreclosure for Secondary 
Breaches: A Practitioner’s Guide to Defining “Security Impairment,” 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2563, 
2584 n.131 (2005) (“It is a fundamental precept of contract law that a party has a duty to read a con-
tract . . . .”); Charles L. Knapp, Is There a “Duty to Read”?, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1083, 1085 (2015) 
(“The notion that there is in general contract law a ‘duty to read’ . . . persists in the decisions of Amer-
ican courts.”); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Wolves of the World Wide Web: Reforming 
Social Networks’ Contracting Practices, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1431, 1451 (2014) (“The duty to 
read is a long-standing principle in Anglo-American contract law . . . .”); Jennifer L. Nusbaum, Com-
ment, North Carolina’s Duty to Read: The Demise of Accountability for Transactional Attorneys?, 92 
N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 147, 149 (2014), https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/ba77b5_46831ce6df9c4d
afbd635601a189eb0a.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8TL-5VUX] (“Courts have long recognized an individu-
al’s duty to read a document when contracting with another party.”). 
 3 See Richard A. Epstein, Contract, Not Regulation: UCITA and High-Tech Consumers Meet 
Their Consumer Protection Critics, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE ‘INFORMATION 
ECONOMY,’ 205, 227 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006) (“[I]t seems clear that most consumers—of whom I 
am proudly one—never bother to read these terms anyhow: we know what they say on the issue of 
firm liability, and adopt a strategy of ‘rational ignorance’ to economize on the use of our time.”); Jeff 
Sovern, The Content of Consumer Law Classes III, 22 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 2, 6 (reporting survey 
results according to which 57% of consumer law professors “rarely or never” read consumer con-
tracts); Debra Cassens Weiss, Chief Justice Roberts Admits He Doesn’t Read the Computer Fine 
Print, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.abajournal.com/ news/article/chief_justice_roberts_
admits_he_doesnt_read_the_computer_fine_print [https://perma.cc/964P-EGVW]. 
 4 See, e.g., Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Stand-
ard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2014) (providing empirical data to demonstrate that 
virtually no consumers read end user license agreements); Shmuel I. Becher & Esther Unger-Aviram, 
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hand, courts routinely apply the duty to read to consumer contracts,5 including 
online boilerplate agreements.6 
Many share a strong intuition that consumer standard form contracts, 
which bombard us on a daily basis, are unreasonably lengthy and complicat-
ed.7 Yet under U.S. law, the duty to read is unilateral: although consumers are 
presumed to read contracts, there is no general duty on suppliers to provide 
consumers with readable contracts.8 Although some states have enacted plain 
language laws, these are often limited in scope and generally lack objective 
criteria defining a “readable” text.9 Given this legal reality, this Article empiri-
cally assesses whether consumer contracts—which consumers are legally pre-
sumed to read—are readable.10 
This Article specifically tests, for the first time, the readability of a preva-
lent type of consumer agreement: the sign-in-wrap contract. As explained in 
more detail below,11 in such contracts users allegedly agree to the website’s 
                                                                                                                           
The Law of Standard Form Contracts: Misguided Intuitions and Suggestions for Reconstruction, 8 
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 199, 206 (2010) (providing empirical data that most consumers are not 
likely to read typical consumer contracts ex ante); Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency 
Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679, 680 (“[C]ommentators agree that buyers, or the vast majority of 
them, do not read the terms presented to them by sellers.”) (footnotes omitted); Lewis A. Kornhauser, 
Comment, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1163 (1976) (“In general the 
consumer will not have read any of the clauses, and most will be written in obscure legal terms.”); see 
also Stacy-Ann Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Data in the Era of the Internet of Things, 59 B.C. L. 
REV. 423, 442 (2018) (noting that, in the context of internet privacy policies, consumers often neither 
read nor understand contractual provisions). 
 5 See, e.g., Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 548 n.10 (providing examples of the application of 
the duty to read in the context of consumer contracts); see also Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer 
Model of Consumer Assent to Standard Form Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 
211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227, 230 (2007) (“Contract law has always assumed that consumers have a 
duty to read the contracts . . . .”); Becher, supra note 2, at 730 n.32 (“Indeed, applying a strict duty to 
read contracts, including [standard form contracts], is currently a dominant approach taken by 
courts.”). 
 6 See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 1453 (noting that “courts have expanded the duty to read 
. . . to the world of electronic boilerplate”). 
 7 Cf. Barnes, supra note 5, at 233–34, 237 (discussing the prevalence of standard form contracts 
and asserting that consumers are unlikely to be able to comprehend their terms). 
 8 See infra Part I.A. 
 9 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 487A-1 (2018) (containing Hawaii’s plain language in consumer 
transactions statute, but providing exclusions to which the statute does not apply); MINN. STAT. 
§ 325G.31 (2012) (requiring nearly all consumer contracts to be “clear[ly] and coherent[ly]” written, 
but failing to provide objective criteria); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1103 (2017) (laying out the plain 
language requirements for contracts); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-2 (West 2012 & Supp. 2019) (requir-
ing particular consumer contracts to be written in an “easily readable way”); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW 
§ 5-702 (McKinney 2012 & Supp. 2019) (providing that certain written agreements shall be “[w]ritten 
in a clear and coherent manner using words with common and every day meanings”); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 180.545 (2017) (describing Oregon’s plain language standards). 
 10 See infra Part II. 
 11 See infra Part I.B. 
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terms by signing up for the website. This type of contract is rather ubiqui-
tous,12 and it is routinely “accepted” by consumers when they sign up for vari-
ous online websites.13 Furthermore, it has been at the forefront of many legal 
battles, involving prominent companies such as Facebook, Amazon, Uber, and 
Airbnb.14 
Part I of this Article provides the theoretical context for the empirical test 
of this study.15 It presents the duty to read doctrine and its traditional justifica-
tions, which are based on the assumption that consumer contracts are indeed 
readable. Thereafter, it briefly presents the definition and typical content of a 
consumer sign-in-wrap agreement, which is the focus of this study’s empirical 
test. Subsequently, it discusses prior empirical studies on consumer contract 
readability and the contribution of this Article to the existing literature. Part II 
presents the empirical test of this study.16 It reviews the data that underlie the 
test and discusses its methodology. It then details the results of this study’s test, 
which indicate that sign-in-wrap contracts are generally unreadable. Part III 
discusses the normative policy and legal implications of the empirical results.17 
It further explains the importance and the less obvious implications of reada-
bility, clarifies why market forces cannot suffice to discipline drafters of con-
sumer contracts, and situates readability in a wider, more holistic approach to 
consumer contracts. 
                                                                                                                           
 12 Among the most popular 988 websites in the United States, five hundred (about 51%) use sign-
in-wrap contracts. See infra Part II.A. 
 13 See Selden v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 16-cv-00933 (CRC), 2016 WL 6476934, at *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 
2016) (commenting that “many internet websites . . . now use ‘sign-in-wraps’” whereby consumers 
assent to the providers’ terms by registering to use the websites); Colin P. Marks, Online and “as Is,” 
45 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 11, 37–38 (2017) (noting that sign-in-wrap agreements, which “appear[] to be 
gaining popularity among online vendors,” are “somewhat prolific” and explaining that purveyors of 
goods seem to be shifting to the use of sign-in-wrap contracts). 
 14 Courts have not always explicitly labeled sign-in-wrap agreements as such. See, e.g., Plazza v. 
Airbnb, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3d 537, 552–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 14-
14750-DPW, 2016 WL 3751652 (D. Mass. July 11, 2016), rev’d, 893 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2018); In re 
Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 185 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Nicosia v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 142, 150 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 834 F.3d 
220 (2d Cir. 2016); Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 834–35 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also 
infra Part I.B. 
 15 See infra notes 18–89 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 90–154 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 155–238 and accompanying text. 
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I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Unilateral Duty to Read 
Under the duty to read doctrine, contracting parties are presumed to have 
read the contract before agreeing to its terms.18 Failure to fulfill this duty has 
three main legal implications. First, a party is normally bound by the terms of 
the contract notwithstanding its failure to read them.19 Second, refraining from 
reading the contract does not constitute grounds for voiding the contract.20 
Third, failure to read the contract does not trigger a contractual mistake neces-
sary for contract reformation.21 
In the context of consumer contracts, the duty to read is traditionally 
based on both economic and fairness justifications. From an economic stand-
point, it is assumed that the duty to read may produce several important social 
                                                                                                                           
 18 THI of N.M. at Vida Encantada, LLC v. Lovato, 848 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1325 (D.N.M. 2012) 
(quoting THI of N.M. at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v. Patton, No. 11-537 LH/CG, 2012 WL 112216, at *22 
(D.N.M. Jan. 3, 2012)) (“Each party to a contract . . . has a duty to read and familiarize herself with its 
contents before signing it . . . .”); Rosenfeld v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 952, 965 
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (“Plaintiff has a duty to read the terms of a contract before signing.”); Liggatt v. 
Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co., 46 P.3d 1120, 1125 (Kan. 2002) (“A party to a contract has a duty to read the 
contract before signing it . . . .”); Bailey v. Estate of Kemp, 955 So. 2d 777, 783 (Miss. 2007) (quoting 
MS Credit Ctr., Inc. v. Horton, 926 So. 2d 167, 177 (Miss. 2006)) (“[P]arties to a contract have an 
inherent duty to read the terms of a contract prior to signing . . . .”). 
 19 See Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[I]t is no 
defense to say, ‘I did not read what I was signing.’”); Faur v. Sirius Int’l Ins. Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 
650, 658 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“‘I did not read what I was signing’ will not be considered a valid de-
fense.”); Rosenbaum v. Tex. Energies, Inc., 736 P.2d 888, 892 (Kan. 1987) (“[A] person who signs a 
written contract is bound by its terms regardless of his or her failure to read and understand its 
terms.”); MS Credit Ctr., Inc., 926 So. 2d at 177 (noting that a party may not avoid a written contract 
simply because of the failure to read its contents); Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990) 
(“Contracting parties are normally bound by their agreements, without regard to whether the terms 
thereof were read . . . .”); John D. Calamari, Duty to Read—A Changing Concept, 43 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 341, 341 (1974) (“[A] party who signs an instrument manifests assent to it and may not later 
complain that he did not read the instrument . . . .”); Kaustuv M. Das, Forum-Selection Clauses in 
Consumer Clickwrap and Browsewrap Agreements and the “Reasonably Communicated” Test, 77 
WASH. L. REV. 481, 485 (2002) (explaining that parties will be bound to a contract’s terms even if 
they do not read its provisions). 
 20 See Williamson v. Pub. Storage, Inc., No. 3:03CV1242 (RNC), 2004 WL 491058, at *3 (D. 
Conn. 2004) (asserting that the failure to read a contract prior to signing it does not give rise to 
grounds to void a contract); MS Credit Ctr., Inc., 926 So. 2d at 177 (stating that the failure to read a 
contract does not enable a party to “avoid” the contract). 
 21 RS & P/WC Fields Ltd. P’ship v. BOSP Invs., 829 F. Supp. 928, 969 (N.D. Ill. 1993) 
(“[F]ailure to read the terms of a negotiated contract does not rise to the level of mutual mistake nec-
essary for contract reformation.”); B. L. Ivey Constr. Co. v. Pilot Fire & Cas. Co., 295 F. Supp. 840, 
845 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (“[N]egligence in not reading [a contract] before it is sent to one who acted in 
good faith can bar reformation by the negligent party.”); LG Mayfield LLC v. U.S. Liab. Ins. Grp., 88 
N.E.3d 393, 404 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (“[A] court should not reform an insurance policy where the 
party seeking reformation has failed to fulfill his duty to read the policy.”); Priore v. State Farm Fire 
& Cas. Co., No. 99692, 2014 WL 811776, at ¶ 15 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2014). 
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benefits. To begin with, it potentially increases the probability that consumers 
will read a contract before signing it.22 Without such a duty and its accompany-
ing legal implications, after accepting the contract consumers could challenge 
unfavorable contract terms that they did not read.23 Consequently, a consumer 
would have greater incentive to avoid reading the contract terms.24 In contrast, 
under the duty to read, consumers are legally bound to the contract terms, even 
if they failed to read them.25 As a result, the consumer will arguably be more 
likely to read the contract than under a no-duty to read regime.26 
By inducing consumers to review the contract, the duty to read may in-
crease the probability that the transaction is based on a well-informed deci-
sion.27 This, in turn, promotes consumer welfare.28 Moreover, contract reading 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See Becher, supra note 2, at 729 (asserting that “the application of the duty to read provides 
contracting parties with an incentive to read and understand contracts before entering them”); Omri 
Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the ‘Opportunity to Read’ in Contract Law, 5 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 1, 7 
(2009) (emphasizing that the duty to read “is a method to shift the burden of information acquisition 
to the passive party”). 
 23 See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1269 (2003) (“If buyers could preserve the right to challenge ex post any 
contract term of which they were unaware ex ante, they would have a perverse incentive to avoid 
learning the content of all terms.”). 
 24 Id. 
 25 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 26 Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read—Business Run by IBM Machine, 
the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1058 (1966) (“If one knows he will 
be legally bound to what he signs, he will take care to protect himself . . . .”). 
 27 See id. (noting that consumers will safeguard their interests if they will be held to their con-
tracts). This, of course, assumes that firms will follow the written contract, rather than deviate from it. 
At times, however, firms’ behavior differs from the contractual language. For a discussion of this 
phenomenon and its application, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts 
in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 831 (2006) (describing an example of a 
firm’s deviation from its one-sided contract terms); Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, Minding the 
Gap, 51 CONN. L. REV. 69, 73–74 (2019) (proposing that under some circumstances firms’ lenient 
approach and willingness to deviate from their one-sided contracts may have surprising and harmful 
consequences); Lisa Bernstein & Hagay Volvovsky, Not What You Wanted to Know: The Real Deal 
and the Paper Deal in Consumer Contracts—Comment on the Work of Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, 
12 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 128, 129 (2015) (proposing that examinations of certain consumer 
contracts should focus on “the terms of the real deal—that is, the way sellers actually behave in the 
shadow of both written contracts and the wide variety of other forces that may constrain or influence 
their behavior” rather than the terms agreed to on paper); Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seri-
ously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565, 
576–77 (2006) (considering the need for disclosures regarding the gap between the written contract 
and firms’ actual behavior); Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of 
How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers, 
104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 858–59 (2006). 
 28 Becher, supra note 2, at 729–30 (maintaining that an incentive to read the contract “increases 
the likelihood that agreements will be mutually informed and, thus, that the transaction will indeed 
promote the welfare of both contracting parties”); Macaulay, supra note 26, at 1058 (asserting that 
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can potentially clarify the parties’ obligations and rights.29 Thus, the duty to 
read can also reduce the probability of costly disputes arising from contractual 
misunderstandings.30 Overall, the duty to read has some economic benefits, 
and it potentially promotes efficient reliance on contracts.31 
The other possible justification for adopting a contract law duty to read 
rests on a fairness consideration. According to this justification, if a consumer 
could have read the contract but instead chose not to do so, it would be fair to 
prevent him from avoiding the contract simply due to his failure to have read 
it.32 The duty to read supports a fairness rationale whereby people should be 
accountable for their decisions, including the decision to accept a contract 
without reading it.33 
Some important underlying rationales support the duty to read. These ra-
tionales are based, however, on one central implicit condition: that consumers 
can read and comprehend the contract.34 If the contract is unreadable, the ma-
jor economic and fairness justifications that underlie the duty become ques-
tionable. 
First, from an economic perspective, if the contract is unreadable, the du-
ty is unlikely to induce consumers to read it. In fact, a consumer may be ra-
tionally deterred from reading an illegible contract given its high reading 
                                                                                                                           
under the duty to read “more bargains will approach the economists’ ideal where both leave the bar-
gaining table in a better position than when the negotiations began”). 
 29 See Macaulay, supra note 26, at 1058 (providing that the duty to read will reduce the chances 
of dispute because reading and understanding the agreement would clarify each party’s obligations as 
well as what loss each would experience in the event of a particular risk). 
 30 See id. (noting that the duty to read will reduce the number of disputes that arise during a trans-
action). 
 31 See, e.g., JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 360 (7th ed. 2014) (“[N]o one could rely on a 
signed document if the other party could avoid the transaction by not reading . . . the record.”); 
Barnes, supra note 5, at 246 (explaining the efficiency of the duty to read principle); Calamari, supra 
note 19, at 342 (discussing the implications of the lack of a duty to read). 
 32 See Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 549 (“The duty to read doctrine is contract law’s ana-
log to the assumption of risk doctrine in tort law. A buyer who could have read but did not assumes 
the risk of being bound by any unfavorable terms.”). 
 33 Becher, supra note 2, at 730 (stating that the duty to read reflects that individuals are responsi-
ble for their actions, which “includ[es] the decision not to read (or fully understand)” the terms of an 
agreement); Justin P. Green, Comment, The Consumer-Redistributive Stance: A Perspective on Re-
storing Balance to Transactions Involving Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 46 AKRON L. REV. 
551, 567 (2013) (“Other more general justifications for the duty to read include the belief that people 
should be accountable for their decisions, including the decision to sign a contract without reading it 
. . . .”). 
 34 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 311 (1986) (commenting on 
the disconnect between contract law’s duty to read and the hard-to-comprehend contractual agree-
ments to which the duty is applied); Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 
13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 263 (2002) (noting that certain kinds of contracts are “hopelessly 
unreadable, and the pretense of imposing a duty to read is simply too absurd to sustain for many judg-
es”). 
2019] The Duty to Read the Unreadable 2263 
costs.35 In addition, if the contract is difficult to understand, the duty to read 
may not necessarily increase the probability that the transaction will be based 
on a well-informed decision.36 Consequently, the unreadable contract will not 
necessarily promote consumer welfare. Furthermore, an unreadable contract is 
unlikely to clarify consumers’ rights and duties.37 Thus, the duty to read is un-
likely to reduce costly disputes caused by contractual misapprehensions. 
Second, if the contract is unreadable, the fairness justification that sup-
ports the duty to read is also dubious. There is no legitimate reason to hold 
consumers accountable for terms they justifiably decided not to read.38 In fact, 
when the contract is unreadable, the duty imposed on consumers to read the 
illegible contract becomes unfair.39 
Put simply, for the duty to read to be fair and efficient, consumers must be 
able to read their contracts. As noted, however, the duty to read is not accom-
panied by another corresponding duty that requires suppliers to provide reada-
ble contracts. Stated differently, the duty to read is one-sided: the burden is 
placed only on consumers, who are assumed to comply with the duty.40 
This legal reality generates an important empirical question: are consumer 
contracts, governed by a duty to read, actually readable? We examine this 
question by focusing on an important type of consumer contract: sign-in-wrap. 
The definition and features of this contract are explained next.41 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See Ben-Shahar, supra note 22, at 7 (“[I]f the cost of reading is not too great . . . then reading is 
indeed a reasonable ‘precaution’ one should take before entering a contract. . . . However, . . . when 
reading a contract requires a significant investment of resources—the cost benefit analysis changes.”); 
Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 309 (describing as “inefficient” an individual’s review of texts that she 
cannot comprehend). 
 36 See Becher, supra note 2, at 734 (asserting that only when consumers are able to comprehend 
their standard form contracts might the duty to read lessen information asymmetry). 
 37 See Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 309 (asserting that even “experts” frequently cannot under-
stand the meaning of complex language in consumer contracts). 
 38 See Ben-Shahar, supra note 22, at 7–8 (“Why would we hold someone liable, then, for failing 
to take care measures that are recognized as excessively costly? . . . [I]t is not reasonable to impose a 
duty to read the long boilerplate.”). 
 39 Heather Daiza, Wrap Contracts: How They Can Work Better for Businesses and Consumers, 
54 CAL. W. L. REV. 201, 211–12 (2017) (stating that the duty to read becomes “conceptually unfair” 
when consumer contracts are incomprehensible). 
 40 See NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 176 (2013) 
(stressing that although courts impose a duty to read upon the non-drafter of a contract, they do not 
impose upon the drafter a “duty to draft reasonably”); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 1454 (noting 
the lack of duty for suppliers to provide “readable consumer contracts”). 
 41 See infra notes 42–73 and accompanying text. 
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B. Consumer Sign-in-Wrap Contracts 
Sign-in-wrap contracts are a relatively new phenomenon.42 This Section 
explains what such contracts are. It also clarifies how they differ from other, 
older types of online consumer contracts. 
Firms that operate online offer consumers a few prominent types of con-
tracts, including clickwrap, browsewrap, and sign-in-wrap. Under a clickwrap 
agreement, users are explicitly presented with the entire terms of the agree-
ment; only then are they able (and required) to click on a button labeled “I ac-
cept” or “I agree.”43 Under a browsewrap agreement, the website’s terms of 
use are normally merely posted on the website via a hyperlink at the bottom of 
the screen, and the user assents to the terms by using the site.44 That is, the 
website usually does not attempt to bring the contract terms to the user’s atten-
tion.45 
A sign-in-wrap contract is commonly defined as an agreement that an 
online website requires its users to accept before they sign up to use the web-
site’s services.46 Under such a contract, the website usually explicitly states 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Andrew Lind, The Sign-in Wrap Contract: A New Type of Online Contract, CORNEY & LIND 
LAWYERS BLOG (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.lawexperts.com.au/commercial-law/sign-wrap-contract-
new-type-online-contract/ [https://perma.cc/P2W9-VE5N] (describing the sign-in-wrap contract as a 
“relatively new” online contractual agreement); Internet Agreements to Arbitrate: Know the Four 
“Wraps,” LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG LAW BLOG (Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.litedepalma.com/
internet-agreements-to-arbitrate-know-the-four-wraps [https://perma.cc/SZR7-V7QU] (describing 
sign-in-wrap agreements as “the new kid on the block” and noting that courts have only recently be-
gun to acknowledge them). 
 43 Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that click-
wrap agreements require users to select “I agree” following a showing of the terms and conditions); 
United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 462 n.22 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“Clickwrap agreements require a 
user to affirmatively click a box on the website acknowledging awareness of and agreement to the 
terms of service before he or she is allowed to proceed with further utilization of the website.”); Erin 
Canino, Note, The Electronic “Sign-in-Wrap” Contract: Issues of Notice and Assent, the Average 
Internet User Standard, and Unconscionability, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 535, 539 (2016) (explaining 
that, under a clickwrap agreement, a user must agree to a website’s terms and conditions by checking 
“I agree” on the website). 
 44 Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 75 (2d Cir. 2017) (stating that a browsewrap agree-
ment “generally post[s] terms and conditions on a website via a hyperlink at the bottom of the 
screen”); see Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 400 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (referring to an earlier 
court that described one particular sign-in-wrap as a combination of a browsewrap and clickwrap). 
 45 See Robert V. Hale II, Recent Developments in Online Consumer Contracts, 71 BUS. LAW. 
353, 357 (2015) (noting that browsewrap agreements do not draw the user’s attention to the terms). 
 46 McKee v. Audible, Inc., No. CV 17-1941-GW(EX), 2017 WL 4685039, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 
17, 2017) (stating that courts commonly refer to agreements in which websites “contain a disclosure 
statement that indicates if a user signs up for a given service they accept the terms of service” as sign-
in-wrap agreements); Selden, 2016 WL 6476934, at *4 (noting that in sign-in-wrap agreements, a 
consumer “signs up to use an internet product or service”); Cullinane, 893 F.3d at 61 n.10 (explaining 
that under a sign-in-wrap agreement, a user agrees to a website’s terms simply by registering to use 
the website); Beatrice Kelly, The (Social) Media Is the Message: Theories of Liability for New Media 
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that by signing up to the website, the user agrees to the contract.47 The user can 
normally view the contract terms by clicking a hyperlink, which is located next 
to a sign-up button displayed on the screen.48 This hyperlink is often labeled 
by the website as “Conditions of Use,” “Terms of Service,” or simply “Terms.” 
Accordingly, the sign-in-wrap contract should be distinguished from its 
two (older) “siblings,” clickwrap and browsewrap contracts. A sign-in-wrap 
agreement differs from a clickwrap in that the user can click the sign-up button 
without being explicitly presented with the entire terms of the agreement, 
which are available via a hyperlink.49 In addition, unlike clickwrap agreements 
that require users to click “I agree,” sign-in-wraps may only state that by sign-
ing up to the website the user agrees to the contract.50 Sign-in-wraps also differ 
from browsewraps in that they explicitly notify the user that signing up to the 
website means assenting to contract terms.51 
In short, sign-in-wrap contracts combine the process of signing up for a 
website with agreeing to its terms and conditions. Sign-in-wrap contracts can 
therefore be viewed as a blend of clickwrap contracts, where users are required 
to tick or click on “I Agree,” and browsewrap contracts, where users presuma-
bly accept the website’s terms and conditions merely by using it.52 
Sign-in-wrap contracts often include a set of clauses that can significantly 
affect the user’s legal rights and duties. These typically include: 
                                                                                                                           
Artists, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 503, 514 n.83 (2017) (clarifying that in sign-in-wrap agreements 
“users assent to the agreement by signing up to use the website”). 
 47 Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75–76 (stating that sign-in-wrap agreements inform the consumer that he or 
she assents to the terms of use by signing up to use the website); TopstepTrader, LLC v. OneUp Trad-
er, LLC, No. 17 C 4412, 2018 WL 1859040, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2018) (noting that, amidst the 
registration process, sign-in-wrap agreements often display language such as, “[b]y signing up for an 
account with [website provider], you are accepting the [website]’s terms of service”). 
 48 TopstepTrader, LLC, 2018 WL 1859040, at *3 (explaining that sign-in-wrap agreements pro-
vide a hyperlink to the terms of service); Hale, supra note 45, at 357 (noting that sign-in-wrap agree-
ments make the terms accessible by means of a hyperlink). 
 49 Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 838 (explaining that Facebook’s online agreement, which is unlike 
some clickwrap contracts and has the characteristics of a sign-in-wrap agreement, enables the user to 
click to agree, regardless of whether the user has received the terms); see also Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d 
at 400 (discussing the distinctions between clickwraps and sign-in-wraps). 
 50 Cullinane, 2016 WL 3751652, at *6 (noting that, unlike clickwrap agreements, sign-in-wraps 
do not utilize an “I accept” box); Hale, supra note 45, at 357 (“[The] ‘sign-in-wrap’ differs from 
clickwrap, in that the latter requires the user to click on a button labeled ‘I Agree’ or the like, while 
the former only states that, if the user proceeds to the next step of the online process, she will be 
deemed to accept the terms . . . .”); Marks, supra note 13, at 11–12 (explaining that, in contrast to 
clickwrap contracts, sign-in-wraps only alert users to a website’s terms of use when the user initiates 
the website’s registration or checkout procedures). 
 51 See Hale, supra note 45, at 357 (“‘Sign-in-wrap’ . . . directly confronts the user with a state-
ment that proceeding will be deemed assent to terms . . . .”); Marks, supra note 13, at 12 (explaining 
that sign-in-wraps are “more explicit” than browsewraps). 
 52 See Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 400 (referring to an earlier court that described one particular 
sign-in-wrap as a combination of a browsewrap and clickwrap). 
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1) an intellectual property clause, which informs users that the web-
site data is protected under copyright law;53 
2) a prohibited use clause, which outlines prohibited actions, such as 
database scraping;54 
3) a modification clause, which allows the website to modify the 
terms of the contract;55 
4) a termination clause, which specifies the circumstances under 
which the website can deactivate user accounts;56 
5) a limitation of liability clause, which stipulates the degree of legal 
exposure for the website in actions arising from website usage;57 
6) a disclaimer clause, which states that the website services are 
provided to the users without warranties of any kind;58 
7) a class action waiver clause, under which the user agrees to ab-
stain from filing a class action lawsuit against the website;59 
8) an arbitration clause, which mandates arbitration of disputes con-
cerning the user’s rights and duties;60 
9) a forum-selection clause, which establishes the geographic loca-
tion for litigation between the parties;61 
10) a governing law clause, which specifies which law will govern a 
dispute between the parties;62 and 
11) a time bar clause, which sets a time period within which the user 
is entitled to file any lawsuit against the website.63 
                                                                                                                           
 53 See, e.g., Terms of Service art. 5.A, YOUTUBE (May 25, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/
static?template=terms&gl=US [https://perma.cc/88WL-8E5G]. 
 54 See, e.g., Zillow Terms of Use art. 5, ZILLOW (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.zillow.com/corp/
Terms.htm [https://perma.cc/9YHW-PE5M]. 
 55 See, e.g., Terms of Use art. 4.1, FACEBOOK (July 31, 2019), https://www.facebook.com/legal/
terms/update [https://perma.cc/7V6E-B2G6]. 
 56 See, e.g., Terms of Service art. 14, TWITCH (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.twitch.tv/p/legal/
terms-of-service/#14-termination [https://perma.cc/9WAA-UMY5]. 
 57 See, e.g., Terms of Service art. 8.c, QUORA (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.quora.com/about/tos# 
[https://perma.cc/SFW8-WCTN]. 
 58 See, e.g., Reddit User Agreement art. 11, REDDIT (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.redditinc.com/
policies/user-agreement [https://perma.cc/WV2X-X52T]. 
 59 See, e.g., Netflix Terms of Use art. 7, NETFLIX (Apr. 24, 2019), https://help.netflix.com/legal/
termsofuse [https://perma.cc/5B3Z-A4M4]. 
 60 See, e.g., Walmart.com Terms of Use art. 20, WALMART (July 25, 2019), https://help.walmart.
com/app/answers/detail/a_id/8 [https://perma.cc/TZ8Z-7JZ9]. 
 61 See, e.g., Terms of Service art. 13, YELP (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.yelp.com/static?p=tos 
[https://perma.cc/2EKM-PC85]. 
 62 See, e.g., User Agreement art. 17.A, EBAY (May 30, 2019), https://www.ebay.com/help/policies/
member-behaviour-policies/user-agreement?id=4259#17.%20Legal%20Disputes [https://perma.cc/
95NY-YQB6]. 
2019] The Duty to Read the Unreadable 2267 
Sign-in-wrap agreements and the duty to read them have already been at 
the forefront of various legal battles.64 These battles frequently involve well-
known companies.65 For example, in Fteja v. Facebook, a Facebook user 
claimed that his account was deactivated by the website because of his “reli-
gion and ethnicity, specifically that he is a Muslim and his name is Mustafa.”66 
Although the user filed his civil rights suit in New York state court, Facebook 
subsequently removed the action to federal court.67 Facebook’s sign-in-wrap 
contract,68 however, contained a forum selection clause that stated that any 
claim against Facebook must be resolved exclusively in Santa Clara County, 
California.69 
The user denied reading the sign-in-wrap contract before signing up for 
his Facebook account.70 The court, nonetheless, applied the duty to read doc-
trine. The court explained that a party is not excused from a contract simply for 
failing to read its terms.71 For this and other reasons, the court transferred the 
user’s action to a court in California.72 Because of the lack of a general duty 
imposed on websites to draft readable contracts, the court did not consider 
whether Facebook’s sign-in-wrap agreement was in fact readable.73 
C. Prior Empirical Research 
In spite of the ubiquity of sign-in-wraps, their readability has not yet been 
systematically analyzed.74 This Article addresses this gap by empirically test-
ing the readability of five hundred highly popular sign-in-wraps. In doing so, it 
                                                                                                                           
 63 See, e.g., Terms of Service art. 13, TUMBLR (May 15, 2018), https://www.tumblr.com/policy/
en/terms-of-service [https://perma.cc/G8VW-BLT9] [hereinafter Tumblr Terms of Service]. 
 64 See Canino, supra note 43, at 541–46 (surveying sign-in-wrap litigation). 
 65 See, e.g., Plazza, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 537; Cullinane, 2016 WL 3751652, at *1 (expounding 
upon litigation involving Uber Technologies, Inc.); In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 185 
F. Supp. 3d at 1155; Nicosia, 84 F. Supp. 3d at 142; Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 829; see also Starke v. 
Gilt Groupe, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 5497(LLS), 2014 WL 1652225, at *2–*3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2014). 
 66 841 F. Supp. 2d at 831. 
 67 Id. at 831–32. 
 68 Though the court did not explicitly label Facebook’s agreement a sign-in-wrap contract, the 
facts of the case indicate that it was such a contract. See id. at 835 (noting that the statement “[b]y 
clicking Sign Up, you are indicating that you have read and agree to the Terms of Service” appeared 
beneath the sign up button). 
 69 Id. at 834. 
 70 Id. at 836–37. 
 71 Id. at 839. 
 72 Id. at 844. 
 73 See id. at 839 (applying the duty to read to Facebook’s sign-in-wrap agreement, but failing to 
consider whether it was readable). 
 74 Cf. Marks, supra note 13, at 37–38 (explaining that sign-in-wraps have become increasingly 
prevalent). 
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expands the efforts of two other major scholarly studies that examined the 
readability of other types of consumer contracts. 
The first important study, conducted by Professors Marotta-Wurgler and 
Taylor, measured the readability level of 264 online End User License Agree-
ments (EULAs) found with software products.75 Most of these EULAs came 
from browsewrap and clickwrap agreements.76 The study found that EULAs 
were difficult to read.77 
The second significant study, conducted by Professors Rustad and 
Koenig, examined the readability level of the Terms of Use (TOUs) of 329 
U.S. and foreign social media websites.78 These TOUs mainly came, once 
again, from browsewrap and clickwrap agreements.79 For each website in the 
sample, the study tested the readability level of its entire TOUs.80 In addition, 
it examined the readability of three contractual clauses included in these 
TOUs: warranty disclaimers, limitations of liability, and arbitration provi-
sions.81 The authors found that the TOUs tested in the study were written at a 
reading level beyond the comprehension of the average American.82 
This Article makes several major contributions to the existing empirical 
legal studies on the readability of consumer contracts. First, previous studies 
focused only on two consumer contract categories: software (Marotta-Wurgler 
and Taylor’s study) or social networking (Rustad and Koenig’s study).83 This 
study, however, includes a highly heterogeneous sample. This Article’s sample 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and Innovation in Con-
sumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240, 243, 250–51 (2013) (examining in depth the 
EULA, an “important type of online standard-form contract”). 
 76 See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Even More Than You Wanted to Know About the Failures of 
Disclosure, 11 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 63, 66–67 (2015) (demonstrating that nearly 200 out 
of 264 EULAs were either a browsewrap or clickwrap agreement). For the definition of browsewrap 
and clickwrap agreements, see supra Part I.B. 
 77 Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 75, at 253. 
 78 See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 1437. 
 79 See id. at 1512 (noting that 216 out of 329 contracts were either browsewraps or clickwraps). 
 80 See id. at 1438 (noting that the article examines 329 terms of use). 
 81 Id. at 1435. 
 82 Id. at 1456 (“Our empirical study confirms that . . . social media providers are drafting onerous 
rights-foreclosure clauses at a reading level substantially beyond the comprehension of the average 
consumer.”). Another study, conducted by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, showed that 
arbitration clauses in a sample of consumer financial agreements are difficult to read. See CONSUMER 
FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD–FRANK 
WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(A) 27–29 (2015), http://files.
consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf [https://perma.
cc/FQB6-DCQD] (asserting that arbitration clauses were generally “more complex” than the con-
tract’s remaining clauses). 
 83 See Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 75, at 243 (studying the EULAs utilized by soft-
ware firms); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 1437 (studying the terms of use of social networking 
firms). 
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covers, for example, categories ranging from merchandise to news and media, 
tourism to video games and file sharing, business services and social network-
ing to software.84 Second, previous studies examined clickwraps, a type of 
agreement that is rarely used nowadays by internet websites.85 In contrast, this 
Article focuses on sign-in-wraps, which are widespread online.86 Third, previ-
ous studies examined the readability of browsewraps, which courts often re-
fuse to enforce against consumers.87 Courts often view browsewraps with sus-
picion because consumers normally do not actively express assent to their 
terms.88 This Article, however, focuses on sign-in-wrap agreements, which 
courts routinely enforce against consumers.89 
                                                                                                                           
 84 See infra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 85 See Marks, supra note 13, at 38 (noting that clickwrap agreements are seldom utilized). 
 86 See id. at 37–38 (explaining that sign-in-wrap agreements have become ubiquitous); see also 
Selden, 2016 WL 6476934, at *4 (noting that numerous websites have begun to utilize sign-in-wrap 
contracts). 
 87 See Meyer v. Kalanick, 200 F. Supp. 3d 408, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), vacated, 868 F.3d 66 (2d 
Cir. 2017) (quoting Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 129 n.18 (2d Cir. 2012)) (“Courts will 
generally enforce browsewrap agreements only if they have ascertained that a user ‘had actual or 
constructive knowledge of the site’s terms and conditions, and . . . manifested assent to them.’ This is 
rarely the case for individual consumers.”); Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 836 (noting that prior courts 
have often enforced browsewrap agreements against businesses, but not individual consumers); Mark 
A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 472 (2006) (surveying litigation involving browse-
wraps and concluding that courts enforced their terms only against corporations, not individual users). 
 88 Rodman v. Safeway Inc., No. 11-cv-03003-JST, 2015 WL 604985, *10 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 
2015) (stating that courts are “skeptic[al]” of browsewrap agreements); see Meyer, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 
416 (identifying the rare circumstances in which courts will enforce browsewrap contracts against 
individuals, namely those in which courts “have ascertained that a user had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the site’s terms and conditions, and manifested assent to them”). 
 89 See TopstepTrader, LLC, 2018 WL 1859040, at *4 (“Courts applying Illinois law have upheld 
sign-in-wrap agreements, although they have not always characterized them as such.”); Kai Peng v. 
Uber Techs., Inc., 237 F. Supp. 3d 36, 48 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (“[C]ourts in this Circuit have upheld 
‘Sign-In Wrap’ agreements where plaintiffs did not even click an ‘I Accept’ button, but instead 
clicked a ‘Sign Up’ or ‘Sign In’ button where nearby language informed them that clicking the but-
tons would constitute accepting the terms of service.”); In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 
185 F. Supp. 3d at 1166 (explaining that the court’s circuit has permitted the practice of one-click to 
assent); Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 400–01 (noting that lower courts have upheld sign-in-wrap con-
tracts in which “the hyperlinked ‘terms and conditions’ is next to the only button that will allow the 
user to continue use of the website”); Jill I. Gross, The Uberization of Arbitration Clauses, 9 ARB. L. 
REV. 43, 51 (2017) (noting that a majority of courts consider Uber’s terms and conditions to be a sign-
in-wrap contract); see also Saizhang Guan v. Uber Techs., Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 711, 723–24 
(E.D.N.Y. 2017) (noting that the plaintiffs “explicit[ly]” agreed to the sign-in-wrap agreement by 
“twice click[ing]” buttons which read “YES, I AGREE”). 
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II. THE EMPIRICAL TEST 
A. Data 
This Article’s sample contains the five hundred most popular websites in 
the United States that use sign-in-wrap agreements. The initial source of data 
was the Alexa Top Sites web service, which provides a ranked list of the most 
popular websites in the United States.90 The Alexa Top Sites service is a lead-
ing website traffic measurement tool,91 based on millions of internet users.92 It 
is built on a significant sample of internet users93 and is therefore widely used 
as a source of data for empirical research.94 
Out of the most popular websites in the United States, we identified the 
five hundred most popular sites—such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon—
that use sign-in-wrap contracts. All of these five hundred websites rank among 
the one thousand most popular websites in the United States.95 These websites 
served as the final sample for this Article. 
According to the aggregated data that we collected from Alexa, the web-
sites in this study’s sample are indeed popular. On average, more than ten mil-
                                                                                                                           
 90 See Alexa Top Sites, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, https://aws.amazon.com/alexa-top-sites/ [https://
perma.cc/6D4U-5SXN]. According to Alexa, the ranking of a website is determined by a combination 
of unique visitors and page views. See id. 
 91 Estela Marine-Roig, A Webometric Analysis of Travel Blogs and Review Hosting: The Case of 
Catalonia, 31 J. TRAVEL & TOURISM MARKETING 381, 386 (2014); Adela-Laura Popa et al., The 
Online Strategy of Romanian Higher Education Institutions: Present and Future, in 1 ENTREPRE-
NEURSHIP, BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 413, 420 (Mehmet Huseyin Bilgin & Hakan Danis eds., 2016) 
(noting that Alexa Traffic Rank is one of the most prominent and frequently used tools to assess a 
website’s performance); Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches Be-
tween Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39, 54 (2015) (“Alexa.com [is] 
the most prominent measurement company for web traffic data.”); Arjun Thakur et al., Quantitative 
Measurement and Comparison of Effects of Various Search Engine Optimization Parameters on 
Alexa Traffic Rank, 26 INT’L J. COMPUTER APPLICATIONS 15, 16 (2011) (describing the significant 
popularity of Alexa Traffic Rank as a tool to measure website traffic); Liwen Vaughan & Rongbin 
Yang, Web Traffic and Organization Performance Measures: Relationships and Data Sources Exam-
ined, 7 J. INFORMETRICS 699, 705 (2013) (noting that Alexa is “the largest provider of publicly avail-
able Web traffic data”). 
 92 Greg Orelind, Top 6 Myths About the Alexa Traffic Rank, ALEXA BLOG, https://blog.alexa.
com/top-6-myths-about-the-alexa-traffic-rank/ [https://perma.cc/KS82-9GB5]. 
 93 Alexa Top Sites, supra note 90 (“Alexa’s site popularity traffic rankings are based on the anon-
ymous usage patterns of one of the largest . . . samples of internet users available in the world.”). 
 94 Vaughan & Yang, supra note 91, at 705 (noting that data from Alexa Top Sites have been 
utilized in numerous studies). For examples of studies using Alexa, see Stephen K. Callaway, Internet 
Banking and Performance, 26 AM. J. BUS. 12, 16 (2011); Christine Ennew et al., Competition in In-
ternet Retail Markets: The Impact of Links on Web Site Traffic, 38 LONG RANGE PLANNING 359, 362 
(2005); Chun‐Yao Huang & Shin‐Shin Chang, Commonality of Web Site Visiting Among Countries, 
60 J. AM. SOC’Y INFO. SCI. & TECH. 1168, 1172 (2009); Agnieszka Wolk & Sven Theysohn, Factors 
Influencing Website Traffic in the Paid Content Market, 23 J. MARKETING MGMT. 769, 779 (2007). 
 95 To be precise, and as noted above, the five-hundredth website in our sample is ranked 988 in 
popularity according to Alexa.com. 
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lion U.S. unique visitors visited each website in the sample during the one-
month period preceding this study’s data collection.96 In addition, during that 
period, over two hundred million pageviews were counted, on average, for 
each website.97 Table 1 below summarizes the main statistical data about the 
traffic of the websites in this Article’s sample. 
Table 1. Website Characteristics (September 2018) 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Unique Visitors 10,169,272 7,860,347 11,246,053 
Pageviews 203,202,295 55,643,205 1,446,362,157 
As noted, the categories of the websites in this Article’s sample are highly 
heterogeneous. They include search engines, social networks, general mer-
chandise, news and media, video games, file sharing, email, software, financial 
management, sports, movies, directories, real estate, business services, pro-
gramming, dictionaries, encyclopedias, music, telecom, employment, consum-
er electronics, tourism, web hosting, coupons, and home and garden.98 
B. Methodology 
This study tested the readability of the sign-in-wrap agreement for each 
website in its sample.99 This examination was conducted via two different 
readability tests that are often used together in empirical readability studies:100 
                                                                                                                           
 96 We collected our data in September 2018. Alexa.com included concrete statistical data about 
the number of unique U.S. visitors and page views for 496 out of 500 websites in our sample. For the 
remaining four websites, there was no data. 
 97 According to data collected in September 2018. 
 98 The website categories were identified using the SimilarWeb search engine. See SIMILARWEB, 
https://www.similarweb.com/ [https://perma.cc/2T9H-J2FW] (providing a means of analyzing internet 
traffic information). 
 99 As noted below, 4.4% of the sign-in-wrap webpages included some kind of clarification along-
side the agreement or some of its terms. 3.8% provided a summary of their contracts, which appeared 
just before—rather than alongside—the full contractual terms. In these cases, we tested the readability 
of the sign-in-wrap webpages including their embedded clarifications or summary. In addition, one 
exceptional website (typeform.com) had both a sign-in-wrap agreement and a totally separate 
webpage, defined as non-binding by the website, aimed at simplifying the agreement. In this unique 
case, we tested the readability of the legally binding agreement and not of the separate, allegedly non-
binding, webpage. 
 100 For studies that utilized these tests see, for example, Ian Gallacher, “When Numbers Get Seri-
ous”: A Study of Plain English Usage in Briefs Filed Before the New York Court of Appeals, 46 SUF-
FOLK U. L. REV. 451, 462–63 (2013) (using the FRE and F-K tests to measure the readability of briefs 
filed in the New York Court of Appeals); Rachel Kahn et al., Readability of Miranda Warnings and 
Waivers: Implications for Evaluating Miranda Comprehension, 30 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 119, 131 
(2006) (using these tests to evaluate Miranda warnings and waiver sheets); Lance N. Long & William 
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(1) the Flesch Reading Ease (FRE) test, and (2) the Flesch-Kincaid (F-K) test. 
The tests were executed using Microsoft Word,101 which has also been used in 
many other empirical readability studies.102 
The FRE test, developed by Rudolf Flesch,103 is based on two factors: the 
average sentence length in a text and the average number of syllables per word 
in that text.104 The test is based on the assumption that unreadable texts nor-
mally contain long sentences and words with many syllables.105 Specifically, 
the formula that underlies the FRE test is: 206.835 – (1.015 * average number 
                                                                                                                           
F. Christensen, Does the Readability of Your Brief Affect Your Chance of Winning an Appeal?, 12 J. 
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 145, 147 (2011) (using these tests to analyze the readability of state, federal, 
and U.S. Supreme Court briefs); Richard Rogers et al., An Analysis of Miranda Warnings and Waiv-
ers: Comprehension and Coverage, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 177, 181, 185 (2007) (applying these 
tests to evaluate the readability of Miranda warnings); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 1460–61 
(using the FRE and the F-K tests to evaluate the educational level needed to understand social media 
terms of use). 
 101 See, e.g., ReadabilityStatistics Object (Word), MICROSOFT (June 7, 2019) [hereinafter Mi-
crosoft Word Readability], https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office/vba/api/word.readabilitystatistics 
[https://perma.cc/EH4E-YSGW] (highlighting the readability statistics that Microsoft Word is able to 
collect). Notably, Microsoft Word’s readability test ignores phrases that end with a semicolon and are 
part of a vertical list of phrases. Ignoring these phrases seems reasonable, given their ambivalent read-
ability consequences. Although phrases that end with a semicolon in vertical lists normally do not 
play a dominant role in sign-in-wrap contracts, the authors decided to conduct a stringent readability 
test on a sample of fifty contracts in order to verify that ignoring these semicolons does not have sig-
nificant implications on readability results. In each of these contracts, the authors replaced the semico-
lons at the end of phrases in vertical lists, if any, with periods. The results of the test showed that this 
did not change readability levels in any significant way. (Average readability scores with semicolons: 
FRE = 35.428, F-K = 14.58, sentence length = 27.35. Average readability scores with periods replac-
ing semicolons: FRE = 35.244, F-K = 14.578, sentence length = 27.152). 
 102 See, e.g., Elmer V. Bernstam et al., Instruments to Assess the Quality of Health Information on 
the World Wide Web: What Can Our Patients Actually Use?, 74 INT’L J. MED. INFORMATICS 13, 15 
(2005); Anthony J. Domanico et al., Overcoming Miranda: A Content Analysis of the Miranda Portion 
of Police Interrogations, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 12 (2012); Kahn et al., supra note 100, at 131; Christo-
pher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages After In re Seagate: An Empiri-
cal Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417, 448 n. 186 (2012); Laurel LaMontagne, Note, Children Under Pres-
sure: The Problem of Juvenile False Confessions and Potential Solutions, 41 W. ST. U. L. REV. 29, 53 
n.234 (2013). 
 103 Pranay Jindal & Joy C. MacDermid, Assessing Reading Levels of Health Information: Uses 
and Limitations of Flesch Formula, 30 EDUC. HEALTH 84, 85 (2017) (attributing the FRE to Rudolf 
Flesch); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 1459 n.150 (stating that Rudolf Flesch developed the FRE 
test). 
 104 Thomas C. McKearney & Richard M. McKearney, The Quality and Accuracy of Internet In-
formation on the Subject of Ear Tubes, 77 INT’L J. PEDIATRIC OTORHINOLARYNGOLOGY 894, 895 
(2013) (explaining that the FRE test assesses “average sentence length and average number of sylla-
bles per word”). 
 105 See Joseph R. Razek & Randy E. Cone, Readability of Business Communication Textbooks—
An Empirical Study, 18 INT’L J. BUS. COMM. 33, 34 (1981) (describing “complex writing styles” as 
those that utilize “long sentences with many multisyllable words”). 
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of words per sentence) – (84.6 * average number of syllables per word).106 The 
score produced by the FRE formula ranges from zero to one hundred.107 The 
lower the FRE score, the more unreadable the text.108 
According to readability literature, an FRE score lower than sixty means 
that the text is not understandable by consumers.109 In line with this literature, 
some state statutes apply the FRE test to specific texts, such as tax forms.110 
These statutes require that such texts meet a minimum score of sixty to satisfy 
statutory readability standards.111 Similarly, a score of sixty or higher is often 
                                                                                                                           
 106 Arthur C. Graesser et al., Coh-Metrix: Analysis of Text on Cohesion and Language, 36 BE-
HAV. RES. METHODS, INSTRUMENTS, & COMPUTERS 193, 199 (2004); Nicola J. Kalk & David D. 
Pothier, Patient Information on Schizophrenia on the Internet, 32 PSYCHIATRIC BULL. 409, 409 
(2008); Barbara B. Ott & Thomas L. Hardie, Readability of Advance Directive Documents, 29 J. 
NURSING SCHOLARSHIP 53, 55 (1997); Marli Terblanche & Lesley Burgess, Examining the Readabil-
ity of Patient-Informed Consent Forms, 2 OPEN ACCESS J. CLINICAL TRIALS 157, 162 (2010). 
 107 Donna M. D’Alessandro et al., The Readability of Pediatric Patient Education Materials on 
the World Wide Web, 155 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 807, 808 (2001) (providing the 
FRE test’s range of scores); Arthur J. Hanes, Jr. et al., The “Plain English” Project of the Alabama 
Pattern Jury Instructions Committee—Civil, 68 ALA. LAW. 369, 375 (2007); D. Kerr, Information in 
Diabetes Care: Is There a Need to Dumb Down Even More?, 24 DIABETIC MED. 561, 562 (2007); 
Brittain H. Tulbert et al., Readability of Patient-Oriented Online Dermatology Resources, 4 J. CLINI-
CAL & AESTHETIC DERMATOLOGY 27, 27–28 (2011) (explaining that the FRE scores readability on a 
zero to one hundred scale). 
 108 See Bernstam et al., supra note 102, at 16 (“The higher the ‘Flesch reading ease’ score, the 
easier a document is to read.”); Kerr, supra note 107, at 562 (noting that texts with higher FRE scores 
are more easily understood); Philip M. Linsley & Michael J. Lawrence, Risk Reporting by the Largest 
UK Companies: Readability and Lack of Obfuscation, 20 ACCT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 
620, 621 (2007) (noting that texts with higher FRE scores are more comprehensible); Marcello Moc-
cia et al., Can People with Multiple Sclerosis Actually Understand What They Read in the Internet 
Age?, 25 J. CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 167, 167 (2016) (explaining that a lower FRE score indicates 
that the text is difficult to comprehend). 
 109 Bernstam et al., supra note 102, at 14 (explaining that a score of sixty or above “is considered 
to be minimally acceptable for consumer-oriented information”); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 
1472 (noting that “a score between sixty and sixty-nine is considered the acceptable standard for 
American consumers”); see also, e.g., Peter Breese et al., The Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act and the Informed Consent Process, 141 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 897, 897 (2004) 
(stating that the authors considered texts with a FRE score below sixty as containing “inappropriately 
complex language”); Kalk & Pothier, supra note 106, at 410 (stating that an FRE score of sixty is “the 
lower limit for ‘plain English’”); Harold A. Lloyd, Plain Language Statutes: Plain Good Sense or 
Plain Nonsense?, 78 LAW LIBR. J. 683, 689 (1986) (asserting that “Plain English” is defined as a text 
with a score of sixty or better); Norman E. Plate, Do as I Say, Not as I Do: A Report Card on Plain 
Language in the United States Supreme Court, 13 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 80, 93 
(2010) (explaining that a minimum FRE score of sixty is required “to reach a plain-language stand-
ard”). 
 110 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 316.364(1) (2017) (applying the FRE test to state income tax re-
turn instructions). 
 111 See, e.g., id. (requiring that “[t]he instructions to an individual state income tax return form” 
have an FRE score of at least sixty); see also, e.g., Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 1458 (“States 
incorporating the Flesch test will frequently require statutory provisions to meet a score of sixty or 
greater to satisfy minimum readability standards.”). 
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used by U.S. government agencies to ensure that documents are readable.112 
Along these lines, if sign-in-wrap agreements receive an average FRE score 
lower than sixty, they should be considered unreadable by typical consumers. 
The second readability test this study applied is the F-K test, developed 
by Rudolf Flesch and John P. Kincaid.113 Much like the FRE test, the F-K test 
is based on the average number of words per sentence and the average number 
of syllables per word.114 The coefficients of the F-K formula, among other 
things, however, differ from those of the FRE formula. Specifically, the F-K 
formula is: (0.39 * average number of words per sentence) + (11.8 * average 
number of syllables per word) – 15.59.115 
This formula, developed by testing a large number of readers,116 produces 
a score that estimates the grade level required to understand the text.117 For 
example, an F-K score of seven indicates that only those with a seventh-grade 
education and above will be able to easily understand the text.118 A result 
greater than twelve signifies that additional years of education beyond that of a 
                                                                                                                           
 112 McKearney & McKearney, supra note 104, at 897 (stating that U.S. government entities uti-
lize FRE scores between sixty and seventy to determine that texts are sufficiently readable); Vishal 
Narwani et al., Readability and Quality Assessment of Internet-Based Patient Education Materials 
Related to Laryngeal Cancer, 38 HEAD & NECK 601, 603 (2016). 
 113 See Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. Rustad, Digital Scarlet Letters: Social Media Stigmati-
zation of the Poor and What Can Be Done, 93 NEB. L. REV. 592, 616 n.131 (2015) (citing Rudolf 
Flesch and John P. Kincaid as the co-authors of the F-K test); Adriene Lim, The Readability of Infor-
mation Literacy Content on Academic Library Web Sites, 36 J. ACAD. LIBRARIANSHIP 296, 297 
(2010) (attributing the F-K test to Rudolf Flesch and John P. Kincaid). 
 114 See Nancy Cotugna et al., Evaluation of Literacy Level of Patient Education Pages in Health-
Related Journals, 30 J. COMMUNITY HEALTH 213, 215 (2005) (explaining that the F-K test measures 
the readability of a text “based on the average number of syllables per word and the average number 
of words per sentence”); Ott & Hardie, supra note 106, at 54 (“The Flesch-Kincaid formula evaluates 
readability as the average number of words per sentence and the average number of syllables per 
word.”); Plate, supra note 109, at 93 (discussing the FRE test’s components); Rogers et al., supra note 
100, at 181 (“The Flesch-Kincaid estimates the needed grade level for comprehension via a formula 
that combines sentence length with the average number of syllables per word.”). 
 115 K.K. DuVivier, Grammar and Style Check Programs: Machine v. Man, 25 COLO. LAW. 27, 27 
(1996); Graesser et al., supra note 106, at 199; Plate, supra note 109, at 93; Terblanche & Burgess, 
supra note 106, at 162. 
 116 See Glenda M. McClure, Readability Formulas: Useful or Useless?, PC-30 IEEE TRANSAC-
TIONS PROF. COMM. 12, 12 (1987) (noting that the F-K formula was “derived . . . by testing a large 
sample of Navy technical personnel on their understanding of Navy technical passages”). 
 117 Gallacher, supra note 100, at 458 (“The Flesch-Kincaid test is a reformulation of the Flesch 
Reading Ease Score test that expresses its result in terms of the grade level a hypothetical reader 
should have achieved before the selected passage would be readable.”); Plate, supra note 109, at 93 
(explaining that the F-K test approximates the grade level required in order to understand a written 
text); Rogers et al., supra note 100, at 181. 
 118 See Cotugna et al., supra note 114, at 215 (noting that “a Flesch-Kincaid reading level of 10 
indicates that a 10th grader will be able to read and understand that particular text”). 
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typical U.S. high school are needed to comprehend the text.119 Accordingly, the 
higher the number, the harder it is to understand the text.120 In readability liter-
ature, the maximum recommended F-K score for consumer-oriented texts is 
8.0.121 This recommendation seems to reflect, among other things, that most 
U.S. adults read at an eighth-grade level.122 
In keeping with this recommendation, many state insurance regulators re-
quire insurance contracts to be written at or below an eighth-grade reading lev-
el.123 Likewise, the U.S. Department of Education recommends that health-
related information be written at or below an eighth-grade reading level.124 In 
the same vein, the Food and Drug Administration and the National Institutes of 
Health recommend designing consent forms at or below an eighth-grade read-
ing level.125 Similarly, the U.S. National Cancer Institute (NCI) recommends 
                                                                                                                           
 119 Terblanche & Burgess, supra note 106, at 158 (stating that the F-K formula “indicates the 
number of years of education generally required to understand the text, relevant when the formula 
results in a number greater than 12”). 
 120 Graesser et al., supra note 106, at 199. 
 121 Bernstam et al., supra note 102, at 16 (“The maximum recommended ‘Flesch-Kincaid reading 
level’ for consumer-oriented materials is 8th grade.”); D’Alessandro et al., supra note 107, at 807 
(“Materials should be written at the 8th-grade level or lower.”); Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking 
2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 438 (2011) (“[T]he recommended readability level for . . . text written 
for broad public consumption is no higher than 8.0 on the Flesch-Kincaid scale . . . .”). 
 122 See Elena T. Carbone & Jamie M. Zoellner, Nutrition and Health Literacy: A Systematic Re-
view to Inform Nutrition Research and Practice, 112 J. ACAD. NUTRITION & DIETETICS 254, 254 
(2012) (“Most adults read at an eighth-grade level.”); Marie F. Kuczmarski et al., Health Literacy and 
Education Predict Nutrient Quality of Diet of Socioeconomically Diverse, Urban Adults, 2 J. EPIDE-
MIOLOGY PREVENTIVE MED. 1, 6 (2016) (referencing a National Assessment of Adult Literacy find-
ing that “most adults read at an 8th grade level”); Kendall McCarty & Jayne Rogers, Inpatient Asthma 
Education Program, 38 PEDIATRIC NURSING 257, 259 (2012) (pointing to a finding that most adults 
have an eighth-grade reading level); Meghan M. Yi et al., Readability of Patient Education Materials 
from the Web Sites of Orthopedic Implant Manufacturers, 32 J. ARTHROPLASTY 3568, 3570 (2017) 
(noting the average reading level of adults). 
 123 Richard J. Wirth, What’s Puzzling You . . . Is the Nature of Variable Annuity Prospectuses, 34 
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 127, 130 (2012) (“Most state insurance regulators require that insurance con-
tracts be written at or below an eighth grade reading level . . . .”); see, e.g., 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-
74-11(c)(1) (Supp. 2018) (requiring “discount medical plan organization[s]” to provide certain disclo-
sures at no higher than an eighth-grade reading level); S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-165 (Supp. 2018) 
(applying the F-K test to insurance forms); S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-166 (Supp. 2018) (employing the 
F-K test in the context of insurance-related texts); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-3-202 (2015 & Supp. 2018) 
(mandating that specified insurance texts be written at no higher than a seventh-grade reading level); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-4-105 (2015) (providing that certain insurance disclosures must “achieve[] a 
grade level score of no higher than seventh grade on the Flesch-Kincaid readability test”); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 37-4-201 (2015) (mandating that certain disclosures be written at a seventh-grade level). 
 124 John O. Elliott & Bassel F. Shneker, A Health Literacy Assessment of the Epilepsy.com Web-
site, 18 SEIZURE 434, 434 (2009) (noting that the U.S. Department of Education recommended an 
eighth-grade reading level for “health related” written materials). 
 125 Andrew Schumacher et al., Informed Consent in Oncology Clinical Trials: A Brown Universi-
ty Oncology Research Group Prospective Cross-Sectional Pilot Study, 12 PLOS ONE 1, 8 (2017) 
(explaining that the Food and Drug Administration advises material to be written at no higher than an 
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that informed consent forms used in NCI-sponsored trials be written at no 
higher than an eighth-grade reading level.126 Given these recommendations, if 
the sign-in-wrap agreements in this Article’s sample receive an average F-K 
score higher than 8.0, they should be considered unreadable by casual consum-
ers. 
As noted, the FRE and F-K tests are considered to be reliable measures 
for detecting text readability.127 Both tests are used by many federal and state 
agencies.128 The FRE test has also been used in several U.S. state statutes aim-
ing to ensure the readability of specific documents, such as instructions on in-
come tax returns,129 financial institution forms,130 and insurance forms.131 In 
addition, the F-K test is used as a standard readability test by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense.132 Several states have also utilized the F-K test in statutes 
aiming to ensure the readability of specific documents concerning, for exam-
ple, production contracts,133 credit life insurance,134 and health benefit plans.135 
                                                                                                                           
eighth-grade reading level); Kris A. Walters & Michael R. Hamrell, Consent Forms, Lower Reading 
Levels, and Using Flesch-Kincaid Readability Software, 42 DRUG INFO. J. 385, 386 (2008) (noting 
that “the FDA . . . and National Institutes of Health . . . often advise developing consent forms be-
tween a 6th and 8th grade reading level”). 
 126 Nancy E. Kass et al., Length and Complexity of US and International HIV Consent Forms 
from Federal HIV Network Trials, 26 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1324, 1324 (2011) (“[T]he US Nation-
al Cancer Institute (NCI) recommended that informed consent forms for NCI-sponsored trials be writ-
ten at no more than the 8th grade reading level . . . .”). 
 127 Roger E. Alexander, Readability of Published Dental Educational Materials, 131 J. AM. DEN-
TAL ASSOC. 937, 938 (2000) (describing the F-K test as a “reliable” measure); Razek & Cone, supra 
note 105, at 34; Rogers et al., supra note 100, at 181 (noting that the FRE test is “highly reliable”). 
 128 Hanes et al., supra note 107, at 375 (noting that state and federal government agencies fre-
quently require written texts to meet a certain scoring standard based on the FRE and F-K tests). 
 129 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 316.364(1) (applying the FRE test to state income tax return doc-
umentation). 
 130 See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 4053(d)(1)(J) (West 2015) (requiring select forms provided by 
financial institutions to attain an FRE score of at least fifty). 
 131 ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-80-206(a)(1) (2014) (applying the FRE formula to certain insurance 
documentation); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-4-633.5(1)(a) (2016); D.C. CODE § 31-4725(a)(1) (2013); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 33-3-25(b) (2014 & Supp. 2019); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 431:10-104(1), -105(a) 
(2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-15-325(1)(a) (2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:17-21(a)(1) (West 
2006); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26.1-33-30(1)(a), -36-14(1)(a) (2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 36, § 3645(A)(1) 
(2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-11A-3(1) (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-1605(a)(1) (2016); W. 
VA. CODE § 33-29-5(a)(1) (2019). 
 132 Paul Harris, The Readability of Sample Stories for Eye Movement Recording, 22 J. BEHAV. 
OPTOMETRY 88, 89 (2011); Sven Meyer zu Eissen et al., Plagiarism Detection Without Reference 
Collections, in ADVANCES IN DATA ANALYSIS 359, 361 (Reinhold Decker & Hans-Joachim Lenz 
eds., 2007). 
 133 See, e.g., 505 ILL. COMP. STAT. 17/20(a)(4) (2018) (requiring production contracts to be writ-
ten at or below a twelfth-grade reading level under the F-K test). 
 134 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-29-166; see also id. § 37-4-105(B) (mandating that certain 
insurance forms be written at a seventh-grade reading level, as determined by the F-K formula); id. 
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Furthermore, the FRE and F-K tests are often used together in legal em-
pirical studies on text readability.136 They are also frequently used in non-legal 
empirical studies.137 Importantly, they are highly correlated with other reada-
bility test formulas.138 
C. Results 
This Section presents the fundamental empirical results using FRE and F-
K scores.139 It then examines the statistical relationships between four website 
variables: (a) the number of unique U.S. visitors; (b) the number of page 
views; (c) the FRE score; and (d) the F-K score. 
1. Readability of Sign-in-Wrap Contracts 
The results of this study indicate that consumer sign-in-wrap contracts are 
generally unreadable. As explained, the recommended FRE score for consum-
er-related information should be sixty or higher.140 The median FRE score in 
this study’s sample, however, is 34.20, and the mean FRE score is 34.86. To 
                                                                                                                           
§ 37-4-201(2) (requiring certain insurance-related medical disclosures to have an F-K score no higher 
than seven). 
 135 See COLO. REV. STAT. 10-16-107.3(1)(a) (2016) (applying the F-K and FRE tests to health 
insurance texts). 
 136 See Gallacher, supra note 100, at 462–63 (using these tests to measure the readability of briefs 
filed in the New York Court of Appeals); Kahn et al., supra note 100, at 131 (using these tests to 
evaluate Miranda warnings and waiver sheets); Long & Christensen, supra note 100, at 147 (using 
these tests to analyze the readability of state, federal, and U.S. Supreme Court briefs); Plate, supra 
note 109, at 82, 93 (using the FRE formula to test the readability of U.S. Supreme Court majority 
opinions); Rogers et al., supra note 100, at 181, 185 (applying these tests to evaluate the readability of 
Miranda warnings); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 1460–61 (utilizing these tests to assess the 
readability of social media terms of use). 
 137 See, e.g., Bernstam et al., supra note 102, at 14–15 (utilizing the FRE and FK tests to assess 
the readability of “quality rating instruments intended to be used by healthcare consumers to evaluate 
websites that display health information”); D’Alessandro et al., supra note 107, at 808 (applying the 
FRE and FK tests to evaluate the readability of pediatric patient educational documentation); L.M. 
Greene et al., Severity of Nasal Inflammatory Disease Questionnaire for Canine Idiopathic Rhinitis 
Control: Instrument Development and Initial Validity Evidence, 31 J. VETERINARY INTERNAL MED. 
134, 135 (2017) (evaluating a questionnaire intended for owners of dogs with chronic rhinitis using 
the FRE and F-K tests); Kalk & Pothier, supra note 106, at 409 (“Readability of health-related infor-
mation in other disciplines has been assessed using the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level and Flesch Read-
ing Ease . . . score . . . .”); Kerr, supra note 107, at 561 (applying the FRE and F-K tests to literature 
provided to patients with diabetes). 
 138 See José L. Calderón et al., FONBAYS: A Simple Method for Enhancing Readability of Patient 
Information, 13 ANNALS BEHAV. SCI. & MED. EDUC. 20, 21 (2007) (“The F-K and [FRE] formulas 
have been shown to be highly correlated with other commonly used readability assessment meth-
ods.”). 
 139 See infra notes 140–154 and accompanying text. 
 140 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
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put these FRE scores in context, they are comparable to the score of articles 
found in academic journals, which typically do not target the general public.141 
Furthermore, almost all of the sign-in-wrap agreements in this study’s sample 
(498 out of 500, or 99.6%), received an FRE score that is lower than the rec-
ommended score of sixty. 
The frequency distribution histogram of the FRE scores is represented in 
Figure 1.142 
 
Figure 1. Frequency distribution histogram for FRE scores 
Similarly, whereas the recommended F-K score for consumer-oriented 
materials is 8.0, the median F-K score in this study’s sample is 14.9, and the 
mean F-K score is 14.67. Moreover, almost all of the contracts (498 out of 500, 
or 99.6%), received an F-K score that is higher than the recommended score of 
                                                                                                                           
 141 See HEALTH & SAFETY LABORATORY, EVALUATION OF PRODUCT DOCUMENTATION PRO-
VIDED BY SUPPLIERS OF HAND HELD POWER TOOLS 14 (2009), http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/
rr714.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZVJ2-EB25] (applying FRE tests to a variety of example texts, including 
scientific and academic journals); Laurence Coey, Readability of Printed Educational Materials Used 
to Inform Potential and Actual Ostomates, 5 J. CLINICAL NURSING 359, 361 (1996) (same); Sheila 
Payne et al., Written Information Given to Patients and Families by Palliative Care Units: A National 
Survey, 355 LANCET 1792, 1792 (2000) (noting that the FRE scores of academic journals range from 
thirty-one to fifty); Alastair Scotland, Towards Readability and Style, 7 COMMUNITY MED. 126, 127 
(1985) (specifying the standard FRE scores of academic journals). 
 142 Because some platforms do not reproduce images, we have archived all graphics herein at 
https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/bc1/schools/law/pdf/law-review-content/BCLR/60-8/benoliel-graphics.
pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5R4-Z4L5]. For the vigilant reader who is not accustomed to reading histo-
grams, it is important to clarify that, in Figure 1, the bar under the value “45” represents scores rang-
ing from forty to forty-five, the bar under the value “50” represents scores ranging from forty-five to 
fifty, and so on. 
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8.0. As in the case of the FRE test, under the F-K test 99.6% of the contracts 
are unlikely to be understood by consumers. 
Figure 2 represents the frequency distribution histogram for the F-K 
scores. 
 
Figure 2. Frequency distribution histogram for F-K scores 
Furthermore, according to readability literature, the average sentence 
length of a text should be no more than twenty-five words;143 otherwise, the 
text is likely to be hard to read.144 Yet in 70.4% of the sign-in-wrap agreements 
in this study’s sample, the average (!) sentence length is longer than twenty-
five words.145 This result also indicates that sign-in-wrap agreements are typi-
                                                                                                                           
 143 See, e.g., BRYAN A. GARNER, LEGAL WRITING IN PLAIN ENGLISH 27 (2d ed. 2013) (recom-
mending that sentences be kept “to about 20 words” in length); RICHARD C. WYDICK, PLAIN ENGLISH 
FOR LAWYERS 36 (5th ed. 2005) (“Keep the average sentence length below 25 words.”); Gallacher, 
supra note 100, at 477–78 (noting the Plain English recommendation for the maximum number of 
words that a sentence should contain ranges from twenty to twenty-five); Joseph Kimble, The Ele-
ments of Plain Language, 81 MICH. B.J. 44, 44 (2002) (noting that “short and medium-length sentenc-
es” are preferable and that, on average, sentences should be kept to twenty words); see also Wayne 
Schiess, The Art of Consumer Drafting, 11 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 1, 4–5 (2007) (citing twenty-
five words per sentence as the recommended maximum). 
 144 BRYCE T. MCINTYRE, ENGLISH NEWS WRITING 19 (1996); Nirmaldasan, Longer the Sentence, 
Greater the Strain, READABILITY MONITOR (Apr. 30, 2012), https://strainindex.wordpr ess.com/2012/
04/30/longer-the-sentence-greater-the-strain/ [https://perma.cc/2DUB-3DUS]; Sara Vincent, Sentence 
Length: Why 25 Words Is Our Limit, INSIDE GOV.UK (Aug. 4, 2014), https://insidegovuk.blog.gov.
uk/2014/08/04/sentence-length-why-25-words-is-our-limit/ [https://perma.cc/5A38-URW7]. 
 145 The average sentence length of each sign-in-wrap was obtained via Microsoft Word. See Mi-
crosoft Word Readability, supra note 101. 
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cally unreadable. Figure 3 represents the frequency distribution histogram for 
the average sentence length. 
 
Figure 3. Frequency distribution histogram for average sentence length 
Anecdotally, several sign-in-wrap agreements contained extremely long 
sentences comprising many more than twenty-five words.146 For example, one 
of the sign-in-wrap contracts contains the following 161-word sentence, which 
is difficult to read.147 Try out the challenge of reading it aloud without running 
out of breath. 
To the greatest extent permitted by law, under no circumstances will 
Grinding Gear Games, its employees, contractors or agents be liable 
to you in contract, tort, equity, statute, regulation or otherwise for 
any loss, damage, costs, legal costs, professional and other expenses 
of any nature whatsoever incurred or suffered by you or by any 
third-party, whether direct or consequential (including without limi-
tation any economic loss or other loss of turnover, profits, business 
or goodwill) arising out of any dispute or contractual, tortious or 
other claims or proceedings made by or bought [sic] against you 
which relate in any way to your access and use of any of the Web-
site, Materials and Services, including without limitation in relation 
                                                                                                                           
 146 See, e.g., Path of Exile Terms of Use, GRINDING GEAR GAMES, https://www.pathofexile.com/
account/create [https://perma.cc/8DRW-B475] (containing sentences that are greater than twenty-five 
words in length). 
 147 See id. (containing the sign-in-wrap contract required to utilize the Path of Exile website). 
2019] The Duty to Read the Unreadable 2281 
to any Posts or Images or any breach by you of the Posting Policy or 
Image Policy, or in respect of any failure or omission on the part of 
Grinding Gear Games to comply with its obligations as set out in 
these Terms of Use.148 
Did you do it? Perhaps most readers did not even bother trying. Presuma-
bly, the very few who tried abandoned the task without completing it and 
quickly moved on. This is exactly how consumers are likely to respond to such 
a dense text. 
2. Statistical Relationships 
This study used the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient to quantify 
the statistical relationships between a website’s U.S. unique visitors count, 
number of page views, FRE score, and F-K score. This coefficient is a nonpar-
ametric measure that assesses the relationship between the rankings of two 
variables rather than between their actual values.149 It is therefore robust to 
outliers,150 which were identified in this study’s data. 
Specifically, yet unsurprisingly, the website Google.com is an outlier for 
two reasons. First, it had a substantially higher rate of page views than all other 
websites. Notably, while it boasted approximately thirty-one billion page 
views, the second largest observation in this study’s sample, Reddit.com, had 
about five billion page views (a ratio of about 6:1). Second, Google.com had 
the highest number of unique visitors, about 171 million, significantly higher 
than all other websites, including the second largest observation, Face-
book.com, which had eighty-nine million unique visitors. 
The results of the bivariate analysis are troubling from a consumer policy 
perspective. First, the results show that the relationships between the number 
of unique visitors and the FRE and F-K scores are weak and do not attain sta-
tistical significance.152F151 These results might imply that the poor readability 
scores found in this sample are not limited to popular websites with many 
unique visitors. Hence, they might also be found in many other, less crowded 
sites not examined in this study. Even worse, the associations between the 
number of page views and the FRE and F-K scores were weak and statistically 
                                                                                                                           
 148 Id. 
 149 See Marine-Roig, supra note 91, at 391 (noting that Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient 
“measures the strength and direction of the association between two ordinal level variables”). 
 150 See, e.g., M.M. Mukaka, Statistics Corner: A guide to Appropriate Use of Correlation Coeffi-
cient in Medical Research, 24 MALAWI MED. J. 69, 69 (2012) (stating that Spearman’s rank correla-
tion coefficient is “appropriate when one or both variables are skewed or ordinal and is robust when 
extreme values are present”). 
 151 r = 0.06, p = 0.15 and r = -0.05, p = 0.32 for FRE and F-K, respectively. 
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significant, meaning that they could not be attributed merely to chance.152 
These results might imply that websites with fewer page views than the popu-
lar sites tested in this study are likely, to some degree, to have even poorer 
readability scores.153 
Unsurprisingly, the correlation between the FRE and F-K scores was 
strong and negative.154 This correlation implies that the two scores quantify 
readability in a comparable way. Figure 4 is a scatterplot for the FRE and F-K 
scores that illustrates the linear negative relationship between these two varia-
bles. 
 
Figure 4. Scatterplot for FRE and F-K scores 
III. DISCUSSION AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
Under the duty to read doctrine, consumers are legally expected to read 
consumer contracts before agreeing to their terms.155 This study empirically 
demonstrates, however, that these contracts are often unreadable. Specifically, 
this study indicates that the sign-in-wrap contracts of highly popular websites 
in the United States are mostly written in an unreadable manner.156 
Unreadable sign-in-wrap contracts entail higher transaction costs for 
those consumers who wish to become familiar with the terms of their con-
tracts. Unreadable contracts also mean that fewer consumers are able to make 
                                                                                                                           
 152 r = 0.15, p < 0.001 and r = -0.12, p = 0.01 for FRE and F-K, respectively. 
 153 Notably, the results of our analysis also show a moderate correlation between the number of 
unique visitors and page views (r = 0.58, p < 0.001). 
 154 r = -0.92, p < 0.001. 
 155 See supra Part I.A. 
 156 See supra Part II.C.1. 
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informed decisions based on their contracts. Although this is true with respect 
to all consumers, it is especially acute in the case of some vulnerable groups of 
consumers, such as immigrants, the poor, and the less-educated.157 
Overall, unreadable contracts increase the risk of a fundamental market 
failure in the form of information asymmetry.158 Such contracts also reduce 
consumers’ ability to engage in comparison shopping,159 which in turn reduces 
firms’ incentive to draft efficient contracts. Similarly, unreadable contracts in-
crease the reading costs of third parties—such as pro-consumer organizations 
and online review websites and platforms—that may be willing to compare, 
study, and rank consumer contracts.160 All of this weakens competition over 
contractual terms, which makes the market more likely to offer low-quality 
contracts.161 
The results of this study, which indicate that consumer sign-in-wrap con-
tracts are difficult to read, are relevant to the general pool of consumers. Near-
ly ninety percent of U.S. adult consumers use the internet at least occasional-
ly.162 Eighty-five percent of Americans get online news from their desktop 
computers.163 Approximately eighty percent are online shoppers.164 Over sev-
                                                                                                                           
 157 See Kuczmarski et al., supra note 122, at 1 (noting that individuals living below the poverty 
line have lower “health literacy” than those above the poverty line). 
 158 See, e.g., Becher, supra note 2, at 734 (“The existence of obligational asymmetric information 
is a serious market failure that can undermine the efficiency of many consumer transactions. Contracts 
will systematically increase welfare if, and only if, contracting parties have the information necessary 
for an informed evaluation of all transactional aspects (including, of course, contract terms).”). 
 159 See, e.g., Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 75, at 275 (“The implication of this trend [of 
drafting hard-to-read contracts] is that, to the extent consumers read terms to comparison shop, the 
cost of becoming informed about terms has increased.”); see also Becher, supra note 2, at 742 (“An-
other premise that the market analysis relies on is that, in a competitive market, consumers can choose 
among different [standard form contracts] and thus avoid unfair provisions.”). 
 160 See, e.g., Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 75, at 275 (noting that difficult-to-read con-
tracts also increase transaction costs for intermediaries); cf. Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 4, at 
223–24 (noting that review by intermediaries is one way to “mitigate” the problem of lengthy and 
unreadable contracts). 
 161 See, e.g., Becher, supra note 2, at 743 (noting that information asymmetry in consumer con-
tracts arguably incentivizes providers “to compete over several salient transactional terms while racing 
to the bottom on others” and that the “race to the bottom allows firms to offset for the costs of com-
peting over the salient terms, most prominently the price”); Korobkin, supra note 23, at 1270 (ex-
plaining that when contractual terms become non-salient, it incentivizes providers to offer low-quality 
terms, regardless of the efficiency of those terms). 
 162 J. Clement, Share of Adults in the United States Who Use the Internet from 2000 to 2019, 
STATISTA (June 18, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/185700/percentage-of-adult-internet-
users-in-the-united-states-since-2000/ [https://perma.cc/TJ7D-UNLR] (demonstrating that in 2018, 
89% of adults in the United States used the internet “at least occasionally”); Internet/Broadband Fact 
Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2019), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/internet-broadband/ 
[https://perma.cc/SVZ8-TQNB] (noting that “nine-in-ten American adults use the internet”). 
 163 Michael Barthel & Amy Mitchell, Americans’ Attitudes About the News Media Deeply Divid-
ed Along Partisan Lines, PEW RES. CTR. 16 (May 10, 2017), https://www.journalism.org/wp-content/
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enty percent of Americans have utilized some form of shared or on-demand 
online service.165 The majority of U.S. adults also use two or more social me-
dia platforms.166 These statistics demonstrate that the vast majority of Ameri-
cans face unreadable contracts on a regular basis. 
A. Policy Recommendations 
In view of the alarming results of this study, policymakers should consid-
er imposing a general readability duty on consumer contract drafters. Under 
the suggested readability duty, drafters will be required to provide contracts 
that consumers can easily understand. Some states have already taken this 
path, at least with respect to some types of contracts.167 Such a duty, however, 
should be a general one and accompanied by clear criteria. 
To make this proposal practical and easy to enforce (and to comply with), 
consumer contracts should be aligned with the FRE and F-K standards. These 
standards are easy to employ and verify,168 and they are commonly recom-
mended for consumer-oriented materials.169 According to the suggested reada-
bility duty, if a consumer contract that targets the general pool of consumers 
receives an FRE score under sixty or an F-K score above 8.0, the drafter would 
be considered in breach of this duty.170 In such cases, consumers should be 
relieved from the duty to read.171 To further incentivize firms, courts can sub-
                                                                                                                           
uploads/sites/8/2017/05/PJ_2017.05.10_Media-Attitudes_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/6K4A-KVAC] 
(noting that 85% of Americans get news via “a desktop computer”). 
 164 Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Online Shopping and E-Commerce, PEW RES. CTR. 2 (Dec. 
19 2016), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2016/12/16113209/PI_2016.12.
19_Online-Shopping_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/LNR2-YH7A] (“[R]oughly eight-in-ten Ameri-
cans are now online shoppers . . . .”). 
 165 Aaron Smith, Shared, Collaborative and On Demand: The New Digital Economy, PEW RES. 
CTR. (May 19, 2016), https://www.pewinternet.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2016/05/PI_2016.05.
19_Sharing-Economy_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/U84Z-UREK] (noting that “72% of Americans 
have used some type of shared or on-demand online service”). 
 166 Kevin Murnane, Which Social Media Platform Is the Most Popular in the US?, FORBES (Mar. 
3, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kevinmurnane/2018/03/03/which-social-media-platform-is-
the-most-popular-in-the-us/#51939b681e4e [https://perma.cc/768W-J7WM] (noting that a majority of 
adults in the United States “use more than one social media platform”). 
 167 See supra notes 9, 123, and 129–131 and accompanying text. 
 168 As noted, the two tests are rather accessible: they are available, for instance, via Microsoft 
Word. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 169 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 170 See supra note 109 and accompanying text (explaining that consumer texts with FRE scores 
below sixty are unreadable). At the same time, contracts that target specific groups of consumers—
such as immigrants or the elderly—may require different readability scores. 
 171 It may well be that not all consumer contracts are the same, and that some might merit a more 
challenging text. In such cases, courts can determine the exact readability threshold after carefully 
reviewing the contract and consulting with experts or consumer organizations. Of course, in these 
cases firms will bear the burden to demonstrate clearly that the contract is reasonably drafted. This 
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stitute the unreadable—and thus invalid—terms with punitive terms that are 
strongly unfavorable to the drafter.172 
Interestingly, a few websites in this study’s sample (twenty-two, or 4.4%) 
opted to provide some kind of clarification alongside the contract or some of 
its terms.173 Arguably, this can be viewed as an attempt to make the contract 
more accessible to the general public.174 Consider, for instance, the following 
example taken from Tumblr.com’s sign-in-wrap agreement: 
Eligibility: 
You may not use the Services, provide any personal information to 
Tumblr, or otherwise submit personal information through the Ser-
vices (including, for example, a name, address, telephone number, 
or email address) if you are under the Minimum Age. The Minimum 
Age is (i) thirteen (13), or (ii) for users in the European Union, six-
teen (16) (or the lower age that your country has provided for you to 
consent to the processing of your personal data). You may only use 
the Services if you can form a binding contract with Tumblr and are 
not legally prohibited from using the Services.175 
Immediately after this term, Tumblr.com provides the following explana-
tion, contained in a rectangular shaded frame: “You have to be the Minimum 
Age to use Tumblr. We’re serious: it’s a hard rule. ‘But I’m, like, almost old 
enough!’ you plead. Nope, sorry. If you’re not old enough, don’t use Tumblr. 
Ask your parents for a Playstation 4, or try books.”176 
                                                                                                                           
idea is beyond the scope of this Article, and the authors leave the conceptual development of such an 
alternative to future studies and analysis. 
 172 For a detailed analysis see Omri Ben-Shahar, Fixing Unfair Contracts, 63 STAN. L. REV. 869 
(2011) (examining the optimal substitutes for excessive invalid contract terms). But see Eyal Zamir & 
Ori Katz, Substituting Invalid Contract Terms: Theory and Preliminary Empirical Findings (Hebrew 
Univ. of Jerusalem Legal Research Paper No. 19-22, 2019) (criticizing and developing Ben-Shahar’s 
model while providing empirical evidence as to what substitute is preferred by people, how the chosen 
substitute changes parties’ willingness to contest excessive provisions, and how it may influence 
judges in determining whether to strike down these excessive clauses). 
 173 See supra note 99. Examples include Pinterest.com, Tumblr.com, and LinkedIn.com. See 
Terms of Service, PINTEREST (May 1, 2018), https://policy.pinterest.com/en/terms-of-service [https://
perma.cc/GSC2-SNFN]; Tumblr Terms of Service, supra note 63; User Agreement, LINKEDIN (May 8, 
2018), https://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement [https://perma.cc/VD5L-Z7KP]. 
 174 Additionally, some websites in the survey (nineteen, or 3.8%), provided a summary of their 
contracts, which appeared just before (rather than alongside) the full contractual terms. See Kinja 
Terms of Use, KINJA (Mar. 24, 2017), https://legal-supplemental.kinja.com/kinja-terms-of-use-179309
4100 [https://perma.cc/S62G-AK7F]; Strava Terms of Service, STRAVA (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.
strava.com/legal/terms [https://perma.cc/Q6GR-9QLT]; Terms of Use Agreement, RATE MY PROFES-
SORS, http://www.ratemyprofessors.com/TermsOfUse_us.jsp#use [https://perma.cc/CP5E-SRDP]. 
 175 Tumblr Terms of Service, supra note 63. 
 176 Id. 
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Admittedly, this seems like a dubious strategy.177 On the one hand, these 
“clarifications” help consumers to better understand the contract. It makes 
reading the terms less boring and strenuous, and arguably more memorable and 
fun. On the other hand, these “clarifications” raise some serious concerns. For 
instance, consumers might be confused as to what exactly they should read: the 
formal term, the annotation, or perhaps both? Relatedly, what parts of the text 
are binding?178 In case of disputes, should the courts prefer one type of text 
over the other; or maybe the latter should merely serve as an interpretive aid? 
Moreover, why should firms use the complicated and formal version, if the 
essence of the term can be captured in a more “relaxed” text? On top of that, 
can more colloquial and humoristic language lead consumers to reduce their 
vigilance, thus not fully realizing the legal risks and obligations the contract 
allocates? Lastly, will such simplification serve as a fig leaf for firms and allow 
these companies to avoid responsibility for drafting unreadable contracts? If 
this indeed becomes a more ordinary practice,179 these and other concerns will 
be adjudicated and probably require further analysis. 
Overall, for now, the FRE and F-K readability tools should probably ap-
ply. These formal linguistic readability tests, however, should serve only as a 
prerequisite legal standard for examining the readability of consumer con-
tracts. True, poor readability scores of texts with long sentences and multisyl-
lable words may normally indicate that the text is difficult to read. It is impera-
tive to keep in mind, however, that websites’ contract drafters might manipu-
late the FRE and F-K tests to generate good readability scores despite the fact 
that the text is not indeed readable.180 In other words, a sign-in-wrap contract 
with short sentences and with monosyllabic words may receive decent reada-
bility scores under the FRE and F-K tests. Yet, such a contract might be un-
readable because it may be lacking a subject and verb in each sentence. 
Policymakers should therefore consider requiring firms to comply with 
more than the common FRE and F-K readability standards. They should also 
prohibit firms from providing consumers with contracts that include substantial 
                                                                                                                           
 177 For an interesting and detailed discussion of similar practices and their potential positive im-
plications, see David A. Hoffman, Relational Contracts of Adhesion, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1395 (2018). 
 178 Interestingly, 36% (eight) of the contracts in this study’s sample that employed such clarifica-
tions explicitly noted that these annotations are non-binding. 
 179 See supra note 99 (noting that only 4.4% of the sample websites included some kind of clarifi-
cation alongside the agreement or some of its terms); see also Hoffman, supra note 177, at 1442 (stat-
ing that “the vast majority of firms, including almost all new economy platform firms, have terms and 
conditions that are ordinary in form and function”). 
 180 Cf. Lauren E. Willis, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Quest for Consumer 
Comprehension, 3 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 74, 74 (2017) (noting, in the context of finan-
cial disclosures, that “firms will run circles around [regulatory disclosure requirements], misleading 
consumers and defying consumers’ expectations”). 
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grammatical flaws. One tool to consider in this context is to require firms to 
ensure that a large segment of their consumers do indeed possess the grammat-
ical capacity to understand key contractual terms, rights, and obligations.181  
Yet another path to keep in mind is technological. Detecting grammatical 
flaws can be facilitated by using modern machine learning platforms.182 In this 
respect, researchers and developers are now toying with artificial intelligence 
platforms and apps as means to read legal texts.183 
Although policymakers need to consider ex ante regulation, courts, in the 
meantime, can intervene ex post. Given the results of this study, judges can 
step in and relax the application of the duty to read vis-a-vis consumers who 
face unreadable contracts. This, of course, is not limited to sign-in-wrap con-
tracts. Rather, judicial intervention should be determined on a case-by-case 
basis. 
When considering legal intervention, the court’s toolkit comprises a range 
of doctrines and principles. For starters, courts can hold there is no assent 
when contracts are written in an unreadable manner. Furthermore, in this con-
text, courts can utilize and develop doctrines such as good faith,184 reasonable 
expectations,185 and perhaps procedural unconscionability.186 Such an approach 
taken by the courts may have a significant impact in the context of consumer 
                                                                                                                           
 181 See id. at 74–75 (recommending that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau should be 
required to demonstrate periodically that consumers comprehend the most salient features of the fi-
nancial products they purchased). 
 182 See, e.g., Gerben de Vries & Rosa Stern, Readability Classification: Combining the Power of 
Machine Learning and Natural Language Processing, WIZENOZE (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.
wizenoze.com/language/en/readability-classification/ [https://perma.cc/Y46L-BM4G] (asserting that 
techniques of “Natural Language Processing” can assess a text’s readability). 
 183 See, e.g., Lisa M. Austin et al., Towards Dynamic Transparency: The AppTrans (Transparen-
cy for Android Applications) Project, IT3 LAB 2 (June 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3203601 [https://perma.cc/5ZM5-Q2U6] (describing the development of artificial 
intelligence technology used to analyze privacy policies). 
 184 See U.C.C. §§ 2-305(2), 2-306(1), 2-311(1), 2-615(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2012) (detailing the obligation to perform a contract in good faith). 
 185 See Gray v. Zurich Ins., 419 P.2d 168, 172 (Cal. 1966) (discussing the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations). The doctrine was originally adopted with respect to insurance contracts. According to 
this doctrine, “[i]n dealing with standardized [consumer] contracts courts have to determine what the 
weaker contracting party could legitimately expect by way of services according to the enterpriser’s 
‘calling,’ and to what extent the stronger party disappointed reasonable expectations based on the 
typical life situation.” Id. (quoting Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About 
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 637 (1943)); see also Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Uni-
versal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388, 394–95 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc) (upholding a similar for-
mulation of the reasonable expectations doctrine). 
 186 See U.C.C. § 2-302; see also Anthony M. Balloon, Comment, From Wax Seals to Hypertext: 
Electronic Signatures, Contract Formation, and a New Model for Consumer Protection in Internet 
Transactions, 50 EMORY L.J. 905, 914 (2001) (discussing procedural unconscionability and e-
contracts); Canino, supra note 43, at 558–62 (discussing unconscionability and sign-in-wrap con-
tracts). 
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contracts. Empirical findings indicate that firms are generally sensitive to liti-
gation outcomes, and that they tend to draft—and sometimes change—their 
contracts accordingly.187 
At times, courts do in fact intervene when the contractual language is un-
readable or confusing. For instance, the New Jersey Supreme Court recently 
held there to be a lack of consumer assent to a contract that had an unreadable 
arbitration provision.188 The court cited New Jersey legislation that requires 
consumer contracts to be readable.189 Though the court did not employ a for-
mal readability test, it noted that “[a]n arbitration clause should at least be 
clear about its meaning; mutual assent is not achieved through ignorance.”190 
This rationale is applicable to other contractual terms as well. 
B. Can Readability Indeed Make a Difference? 
This Section suggests a means of targeting the problem of readability, 
which is the focus of this Article.191 The critical reader may, however, question 
this ambition to make consumer contracts more readable. According to this 
critical line of reasoning, consumers will continue to not read their contracts, 
regardless of how readable or unreadable they are. Making consumer contracts 
more readable, the argument goes, will not change consumers’ attitude and 
behavior. True, firms may be forced to draft readable contracts. Yet, consumers 
will nevertheless refrain from reading these contracts. After all, consumers are 
likely to view these contracts as unduly long and boring,192 they may have a 
(false) belief of legal protection,193 they may dismiss contractual risks in light 
of over-optimism and other cognitive biases,194 many might rationally prefer to 
                                                                                                                           
 187 See Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 75, at 266–74 (finding, among other things, that if 
a term has a lower probability of enforcement, or if its enforcement is declining, firms are more likely 
to respond by removing it). 
 188 Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm’r of Fla., Inc., 199 A.3d 766, 778–79 (N.J. 2019) (noting 
that ambiguity in the arbitration provision of a contract prevents a consumer from knowingly assent-
ing to it). 
 189 Id. at 774 (citing New Jersey’s Plain Language Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:12-1 to -13 (West 
2012 & Supp. 2019)). 
 190 Id. at 785. 
 191 See infra notes 192–210 and accompanying text. 
 192 See, e.g., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: 
THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 8–9 (2014) (arguing that people cannot be expected to 
effectively read legal texts such as disclosures and contracts due to the excessive length of these 
texts); cf. Claire A. Hill & Christopher King, How Do German Contracts Do as Much with Fewer 
Words?, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 889 (2004) (discussing the possible reasons for having long contracts 
in the United States). 
 193 See, e.g., Shmuel I. Becher, Concrete Content to Vague Standards: Behavioral Analysis of 
Consumer Contracts, 33 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 277 (2010) (Isr.). 
 194 See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1407 (2004) (discuss-
ing consumer over-optimism); Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form 
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“free ride” and be enlightened through the reading of others,195 or they may 
also have other good (and not so good) reasons to abstain from reading.196 
The response to this important reservation is fivefold. First, it is next to 
impossible to determine the impact that making contracts readable will have on 
consumer behavior in a void. Only once contracts become readable can it be 
determined whether consumers are more likely to read them. If anything, ex-
perimental evidence suggests that simplified presentation of legal materials 
and forms, such as disclosures, indeed improves people’s understanding of 
those materials.197 This assertion, it should be noted, seems to be conditioned 
on an appropriate surrounding; for example, that sufficient focus and attention 
are directed to the relevant text.198 
Although the existing literature mainly argues that consumers do not read 
standardized contracts,199 this study suggests that even if they wanted to do so, 
it would be quite impossible. It may well be the case that when consumers ex-
pect contracts to be unreadable they are dissuaded from reading them at the 
outset.200 Naturally, reading a text without being able to understand it is not an 
enjoyable and rewarding experience.201 
Second, one should not claim with any degree of certainty that readable 
contracts will revolutionize consumer behavior. Readability is not a panacea.202 
                                                                                                                           
Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 117, 120 (2007) (asserting that cognitive biases play a central role in stand-
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Decades of unsettled scholarship, legislation, and litigation demonstrate that 
the long-lasting puzzle of consumer contracts will not be solved by any silver 
bullet. There is reason to believe, however, that although one cannot read all 
consumer contracts all of the time,203 reading some contracts some of the time 
is a feasible strategy for many.204 At times, reading consumer contracts may 
even be surprisingly beneficial.205 
Third, many consumers may not read their contracts ex ante, even if these 
contracts are readable. Consumers do, however, reveal a stronger tendency to 
read contracts ex post—once a dispute or a problem arises.206 Hence, making 
contracts readable can still serve consumers who tend to ignore their contracts 
ex ante. 
Fourth, consumer organizations and other intermediaries may wish to 
study, review, rank, or comment on consumer contracts. Given the potential 
impact of such platforms,207 the benefit of making contracts more readable—
even if read mainly by such third parties—should not be overlooked. Lowering 
the transaction costs for those who wish to serve the general pool of consumers 
by evaluating standardized contracts is, so it seems, a positive side effect of 
making these contracts readable. 
Fifth, placing the burden on consumers to read unreadable contracts 
yields a strong sense of unfairness. Imposing on consumers the responsibility 
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to perform a task they are unable to accomplish due to firms’ behavior is hard 
to legitimize. Restoring (some of) people’s trust in the ability of the legal sys-
tem to level the consumer-seller playing field is itself a worthwhile objec-
tive.208  
Along somewhat similar lines, consumers have the right to know what 
their contracts say, even if they choose not to pursue this right.209 Promoting a 
reality in which people perceive the justice system as fair is important for its 
effectiveness.210 
C. Can Market Forces Discipline Firms? 
One might argue that readability may not be a problem if other tools and 
mechanisms efficiently discipline sellers. To give one example, proponents of 
the “informed minority” thesis may not find this study’s results troubling. Ac-
cording to the informed minority model, it is not necessary that all consumers 
read all their contracts all of the time.211 Rather, in competitive markets, a mi-
nority of sophisticated consumers who read their contracts and shop for better 
ones may suffice to discipline sellers and encourage them to draft fair terms.212 
Following this logic, the fact that most consumers cannot read their contracts 
does not pose a serious problem as long as a significant minority of consumers 
can. In a competitive market, the supplier will fear losing these informed mar-
ginal consumers to a competitor, who may offer a better contract.213 
In spite of its appeal, there are many reasons to question this idea. For ex-
ample, firms can offer all consumers the same contract yet neutralize the effect 
of the informed consumers by discriminating in their favor and providing them 
with favorable treatment.214 Sophisticated and aggressive consumers may be 
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aware of this practice, and thus may not be too bothered by the one-sided con-
tract.215 In addition to the theoretical limitations of the informed minority 
model, this theory has also received a number of empirical critiques. As noted 
earlier, studies indicate that the actual number of consumer contract readers is 
far smaller than the number of readers required by the informed minority mod-
el.216 
But even if one accepts the informed minority argument, there are none-
theless at least two good reasons to be worried about this study’s findings. 
First, the more complex and complicated contracts are, the less likely there 
will be a significant informed minority.217 Stated differently, as contracts be-
come easier to read and understand, it is more likely that a sufficient number of 
consumers will indeed read them. If we want the informed minority to disci-
pline sellers, we should make it as easy as possible to form such a minority. 
Second, unreadable contracts impose higher transaction costs on those con-
sumers who want to become informed.218 Given the positive contribution of 
these informed consumers, it is hard to think of a legitimate reason to make it 
harder and costlier for them to become informed. 
Although scholars have seriously questioned the “informed minority” 
theory, alternative arguments maintain that other market-based tools may yield 
an efficient equilibrium.219 One such claim is that one way or another, unfair 
contract terms will come to light. Exposure of these terms, especially in light 
of online realities that allow expansive information flows, will harm the deal-
ers’ reputations.220 Therefore, firms that worry about their reputation will avoid 
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the use of one-sided contracts.221 Alternatively, rational consumers would re-
spond to unreadable contracts by lowering their willingness to pay, perhaps 
assuming the worst-case scenario.222 
Although these arguments in favor of a market-based approach have mer-
it, they are not entirely persuasive. The assumption that one-sided contracts 
will grievously injure the vendor’s reputation is doubtful for a variety of rea-
sons.223 For starters, for that to happen, consumers—and the public—must care 
about their contracts enough to generate awareness of the issue. This is most 
often not the case,224 given, among other things, that these contracts are often 
unreadable, as this study has shown. 
In addition, sellers’ concern for reputation is more likely to take the form 
of waiving enforcement of biased terms ex post, rather than excluding them ex 
ante.225 Such a strategy allows firms more flexibility and discretion, and it por-
trays them as kind, consumer friendly, or even generous.226 Furthermore, and 
most importantly, empirical evidence suggests that consumer contracts are in-
deed one-sided,227 indicating that overall reputation is an insufficient tool on 
which to rely. 
The assumption that consumers will respond to unreadable contracts by 
lowering their wiliness to pay is also dubious. For that to happen, consumers 
first need to be aware of the information that is not available for them to evalu-
ate. Then they need to draw the conclusion that this missing information is un-
favorable, thus adjusting their willingness to transact. Such a strategy, howev-
er, attributes much rationality and sophistication to consumers, although a 
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large body of research indicates that this is often not the case.228 Moreover, for 
most consumers much of the language of standard form contracts is usually a 
hidden, non-salient attribute.229 Consumers do not pay attention to these 
terms,230 cannot properly evaluate them,231 and therefore do not price them 
rationally. Indeed, empirical data shows that when facing a lack of information, 
consumers do not assume the worst, and therefore do not lower their willing-
ness to pay in the same way economists assume they will.232 
D. Readability in Context 
To be sure, this analysis should not lead us to ignore other concerns em-
bedded in the law of standard form contracts. Consumers may happily accept 
biased or unfair terms, even when fully informed by readable contracts.233 Alt-
hough one can hope that making contracts more readable will create further 
pressure on firms to draft clear and balanced contracts, there is no guarantee 
that this will happen.234 True, anecdotal evidence suggests that simplifying 
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contracts may coincide with more balanced terms.235 Perfectly readable con-
tracts, however, may yet use legal terms of art that are incomprehensible to the 
average consumer. Such readable contracts may as well be unconscionable, 
excessively long, lacking proper sub-headings, written in rather small font, not 
easily found, or deliberately presented to consumers at a late or uncomfortable 
time when reading becomes unlikely. Thus, courts should remain vigilant as 
ever when a contract is readable.236 
Indeed, readability is merely one piece of the puzzle—even with respect 
to consumers’ comprehension of their form contracts.237 Tackling all of the 
problems and concerns that consumer contracts raise requires experimenting 
with some innovative and creative ideas.238 The fact that consumer contracts 
are unreadable gives more reason to explore this path. 
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CONCLUSION 
Millions of American consumers use the services of highly popular U.S. 
websites on a regular basis. Under the duty to read doctrine, these consumers 
are legally expected to read the sign-in-wrap contracts that they agree to when 
signing up to the services offered by these websites. Accordingly, courts typi-
cally enforce these agreements against consumers even if consumers do not 
read them. 
Sign-in-wrap contracts permit online firms to contract with millions of 
users, with no negotiation, and without verifying that the contract was read (let 
alone understood). Although consumers are legally presumed to read these 
contracts, websites are not obliged to provide consumers with readable ones. 
This legal reality raises an imperative question: are sign-in-wrap contracts, 
which consumers are obliged to read, in fact readable? Is it fair and efficient to 
impose the duty to read on consumers who allegedly accept these contracts? 
According to the findings of this study, the disturbing answer to these 
questions is a resounding “no.” Lacking a clear and strong incentive to draft 
readable agreements, firms often utilize unreadable texts as their contracts. By 
insisting on applying the duty to read in these cases, courts undermine notions 
of both fairness and efficiency. 
